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Workplace Conflict, Legal Institution, and Labour Regime 
Introduction 
Historical institutionalism and historical materialism can cross-fertilize. The 
former approach provided an analytic framework for the repertoires of action 
between collective actors... while the latter laid thefoundationsfor an analysis 
of power and conflict. Both work fruitfully in tandem, and analysis would be 
incomplete in the absence of either perspective. 
Steinberg (2003: 487- 488) 
In Chapter Three and Chapter Five, we saw that the wage was always one of the 
main concerns during workers' strikes, but workers' wage demands were within the 
limit of their legal rights (Lee, 2007a). In July 2005 and 2006, the Shen Zhen 
government significantly increased the minimum wage rate. As workers did not ask 
for an increase in the minimum wage during the strike, it might be reasonably 
assumed that the local state's increases in the minimum wage were an extrinsic 
factor responding more to the shortage of labour than to workers' struggle. In July 
2007, however, against the workers' expectation, the municipal authorities did not 
increase the minimum wage as they had done in the past two years. Touched off by 
this, a new round of strikes took place in the region. These forced the factories to 
raise the wage higher than the minimum wage and the city government to increase 
the minimum wage from October 2007. This development well confirmed the 
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significance of state regulation and legality in the 'politics of production' in China 
(Burawoy, 1985; Lee, 2007a), but disconfirmed Lee's (2007a) theorization that 
migrant workers' actions were based on legal rights as citizens (2007a). As an 
extension to Burawoy's theory of the 'politics of production' or 'labour regime', 
Steinberg (2003) pointed out that the labour regime is in fact embedded in legal 
institutions. According to him, 'free labour' which Burawoy took for granted from 
Marx's analysis of the capitalist labour process, is not an inherent feature of 
capitalist production. In fact, it was a result of class conflict that was reflected in the 
historical development of legal institutions. Building on Chapter Five, where I 
suggested bringing the role of 'unorganized' workers as a collective into the analysis 
of industrial relations, this chapter continues to explore the dialectic and dynamic 
relationship between legal institutions and workplace relations. While Steinberg 
(2003) brought in the legal institutional context for the labour regime, taking the 
example of the rise of 'free labour', I attempt to provide a material account of the 
transformation of the legal context, referring to the minimum wage rate, one of the 
most significant contests for the local state, management, and workers in China. On 
the one hand, legal institutions frame the workplace relation; one the other hand, 
workplace struggle reconstructs the legal framework. Workers' struggle and legal 
institutions worked together to reshape China's changing labour regime (Lee, 1999), 
which I refer to as 'contested despotism' in this stage. 
Legal Institution of the Minimum Wage in Shen Zhen 
As the first SEZ, the municipality of Shen Zhen is a pioneer of labour legislation 
reform. A legal minimum wage was introduced by the city government as early as 
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1993 and extended nationwide in the 1994 Labour Law. The power to set the 
minimum standard is delegated to local authorities according to the living cost and 
economic development conditions. According to a State Council regulation, the 
n-dnimum wage can be adjusted on a biennial basis. In Guang Dong province, it is 
the provincial government that decides the rates for its subordinate municipalities. 
However, as a SEZ, Shen Zhen enjoyed a certain level of legislative autonomy and 
its minimum wage policy was ruled by the Shen Zhen Employees Wage Payment 
Ordinance. Under this Ordinance, the minimum rate was decided by the SZMLSSB 
after consultation with the municipal State Property Management Committee (Guo 
Zi Wei), the SZMFrU, and the city general chamber of commerce and reported to 
the city government for final approVal52. Until 2005, the city government announced 
a new minimum rate for inside the SEZ and another for outside the SEZ in April 
every year which was effective from May Day. 
Before 1 May 2004, the minimum wage of Shen Zhen was always the top one 
in the country (600 yuan for inside the SEZ and 465 yuan outside in 2003 to 2004). 
Howeve;, from 1 May 2004, the 'difficulty of worker recruitment' (Zhaogong Nan) 
or 'shortage of peasant workers' (Mingong Huan) became more serious throughout 
the country. The minimum wages were then generally increased to a high rate, 
especially in the YRD. The rate in Shanghai reached 635 yuan along with Nan Jing, 
Su Zhou, Hang Zhou, and Ning Bo (all in the YRD) at 620 yuan. In late 2004, 
Guang Dong province categorized its affiliate cities, except for Shen Zhen, into 
seven grades and announced a new minimum rate for each grade. The rate for the 
52 The Committee was run as a shareholding institution for SOEs, including those that were privatised 
but in which the city authority still holds part of its shares. 
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first grade, referring only to its provincial city Guang Zhou, was 684 yuan, while the 
second grade, including Fo Shan, Dong Guan, Zhu Hai, and Zhong Shan, was 574 
yuan, and the third grade, including Shen Zhen's eastern neighbour Hui Zhou, was 
494 yuan. All of Shen Zhen's main competitors in both the YRD and the PRD had a 
higher minimum wage than the outside SEZ rate of Shen Zhen. This exerted big 
pressure on the city authorities to increase the legal minimum in 2005 (Southern 
Metropolitan Daily, 3 March 2005). 
Huang Zhao Ji, the Vice-Head of the SZMLSSB spoke at a press conference: 
'The difficulty of hiring labour (Yonggong Jin) has become an important factor to 
constrain the economic development of Shen Zhen... we believe adjustment of the 
minimum wage can play a role in easing the problem of labour shortage' (Southern 
Metropolitan Daily, 3 March 2005). As a result, according to the media report, for 
the first time in its history, the SZMLSSB held a large-scale conference to debate the 
issue (Lunzheng Hui) with the participation of representatives from the SZMFrU, 
the chamber of commerce, enterprises, workers, government departments, and 
academic experts as well as distributing 10,000 questionnaires to both workers and 
enterprise owners to collect their opinions. Because of the wide consultation exercise, 
the effective date of the new minimum wage was delayed until I July 2005. 
The following table shows the minimum wage rate in Shen Zhen from 2000. 
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Table VII The Level of the Legal Minimum Wage Rate in Shen Zhen 
Year Inside SEZ (yuan) Outside SEZ (yuan) 
Monthly Rate Hourly Rate Monthly Rate Hourly Rate 
2000-2001 547 3.14 419 2.41 
2001-2002 574 3.30 440 2.53 
2002-2003 594 3.41 460 2.64 
2003-2004 600 3.45 465 2.67 
2004-2005 610 3.51 480 2.76 
2005-2006 690 3.97 580 . 33 
2006 until 30 
September 2007 
810 1 4.66 700 . 02 
(Source: Shen Zlien Municipal Statistics Bureau, various years) 
As can be seen, the rate was increased at a very modest rate until 1 July 2005 
when the inside rate increased from 610 to 690 yuan while the outside rate increased 
from 480 to 580. Although Guang Dong province did not change the minimum wage 
until September 2006, the Shen Zhen government launched an even larger-scale 
consultation in 2006. The policy-making process reflected the difficulty for the local 
state of balancing the interests of labour and capital, or in the terminology of Lee 
(2007a), legitimacy and accumulation. The official press statement which announced 
the new rate in 2006 stated: 
In order to set up the 2006 minimum wage reasonably, we did our job in two 
aspects: first, to understand the people's opinions comprehensively by 
collecting suggestions widely, including a questionnaire survey, listening to 
people's suggestions through the media, and holding twelve seminars and a 
large-scale conference to debate minimum wage adjustment proposals; 
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second... to consider the scenario that Guang Dong province and some main 
cities in the country had planned to increase the minimum wage remarkably, 
guarantee a balance of supply and demand of the labour market, and facilitate a 
harmonious and stable development of labour relations in our city. 
SZMLSSB (2006) 
According to Huang Zhao Ji at the press conference held on 30 May 2006 to 
announce the new rates, in the composition of the GDP in Shen Zhen, the share of 
enterprises was slightly more than fifty per cent, the labourers slightly more than 
thirty per cent, and the state about fifteen percent. The gap between enterprises and 
labourers was the biggest in the country (Xinhua Net, 31 May 2006). Of note, 'a 
harmonious and stable labour relation' and labour-capital interest imbalance were 
highlighted in the press conference. It was a hint that the significant adjustment of 
the minimum wage responded to both a 'labour shortage' and the unstable 
workplace relations which we saw in the previous chapters. 
On 17 April 2006, the SZMLSSB invited the members of the municipal 
People's Congress and Political Consultative Conference, delegates from industrial 
associations, and representatives from both the workers and enterprises to attend a 
consultation conference (Ting Zheng Hui) where two proposals for the minimum 
wage were presented. One was 800 yuan for inside the SEZ and 700 yuan for outside; 
the other was 850 yuan for inside and 750 yuan for outside. These two packages 
were proposed after wide consultation with the workers and enterprises before this 
meeting. For the workers' side, the Bureau conducted a survey with 20,000 
questionnaires. Most of those attending the meeting supported the lower package 
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(Xinkuai Bao, 18 April 2006). Interestingly, most of the workers' representatives, 
who were middle level managers or personnel officers, also supported the lower rate 
package while the enterprise representatives generally insisted on no more than 800 
yuan (inside the SEZ). Some People' Congress members and scholars suggested a 
middle way between the two Packages (Nanfang Ribao, 18 April 2006). The 
SZMFIU was not reported to be present at the meeting, and the city Party was not 
supposed to participate in such a consultation. Workers' interests were not reflected 
in the conference. Although it was an informal consultation, and the final power 
rested with the city government, the opinions expressed did have an impact on the 
final policy. The government finally tended to choose the lower package, except that 
the inside rate was slightly increased from 800 to 8 10 yuan. Nonetheless, the scale of 
the increase was the highest since the legal rate was introduced in 1993 in terms of 
the absolute amount and second only to 1999 in terms of the percentage increase. 
However, for both 2005 and 2006, the inside SEZ rate was lower than Shanghai. 
The case hinted that the trade unions did not actively represent the interests of 
workers, and the workers' representatives who showed up at the conference were in 
fact manipulated by the management. As a result, the 'middle-way' proposal 
suggested by People' Congress members and academics, which more reflected the 
interests of workers, could not get enough support to be passed. 
From Minimum Wage to Reasonable Wage 
Minimum Wage and Strike 
On 30 May 2006, the Shen Zhen municipal government announced an increase in 
the legal minimum wage from 580 to 700 yuan beginning from July, a remarkable 
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20.7 per cent rise. In July, one of my informants, Xiao Lin, asked me to stay in Shen 
Zhen for a longer time, as he said: 'If (factories) do not increase the wage, (workers) 
will certainly strike. ' Workers well knew the new rate and its effective date from the 
media and each other. Some medium- and small-size factories in the city charged or 
raised workers' fees for accommodation and food as a compensation for the wage 
rise. Workers informed me that workers accepted this initiative as it was 'legal'. But 
all the factories with over 1,000 workers in the militant community increased 
workers' wages according to the new legal rate without deducting any charges. No 
significant strike occurred in the community and surrounding towns, against Xiao 
Lin's expectation. 
Interestingly, the private landlords also increased their rent after the workers' 
pay was raised. A worker complained in August 2006: 
Today my landlord came to see me. He said that the rent is to increase from 
200 to 250 yuan and added: 'Your pay has risen, how come we don't raise the 
rentT Ten years ago, when my older brother worked in Dong Guan, 300 yuan 
could rent a big flat with three bedrooms. Today we can only rent a small room. 
Living in Shen Zhen is more and more expensive now. The wage rise doesn't 
mean the Dagong people will be much better off. 
Although there are no reliable statistics of the strike rate in the city, I observed 
that workplaces throughout 2006 were relatively peaceful compared with the 
previous two years. My revisit to the field site in December 2006 did not find 
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significant strike activities. In March 2007, the Guang Dong provincial government 
announced that the minimum wages in the province would not be increased in 2007. 
On 27 June, the spokesperson for the SZMLSSB said: 'Shen Zhen will continue to 
adjust the minimum wage, but adjustment doesn't necessarily mean rise, remaining 
unchanged or reduced are also kinds of adjustment' (Shen Zhen News, 28 June 2007). 
Finally, the city government did not announce any minimum wage raise from July 
2007 as they had in the past two years. Then, when I paid another visit to the field in 
August 2007, a new round of strikes took place to demand a reasonable wage that 
was much higher than the legal minimum. The new development put pressure on the 
city government to increase the minimum wage from October 2007. In the following 
section, I will elaborate one of these strikes in a German-invested factory that I call 
the Moon factory to explore the changing relations between local state legal 
institutions and workplace conflict on the issue of wages. 
Factory Background and Working Conditions 
Like the Sun factory, the Moon factory also ran two production sites in the Bao An 
district of Shen Zhen, but unlike Sun, whose two plants were within the same 
community with just a five-minute walk from each other, under the same 
management team, and whose workers lived in the same blocks of dormitories, the 
two Moon plants were situated in different towns with a one-hour bus journey 
between and under different management teams, although supervisory staff were 
despatched to each other if needed. The main plant of the Moon factory, where the 
strike was first organized, was in the same town as and just twenty minutes on foot 
from the Sun factory. In fact, one of the locations at which workers in the Sun 
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factory had physical conflicts with the police during the strike in 2004 was at a 
junction of the highway towards the Moon factory grounds. Also, Moon was one of 
the many factories in the town whose workers had followed Sun to strike for the 
enforcement of the legal wage in 2004. 
The German-owned business produces mobile phone chargers and other 
components for the global market. Since it was set up in 1993, it had expanded into 
two large plants in Shen Zhen and another in Beijing. Each of the Shen Zhen 
branches employed about 8,000 workers with almost the same working conditions 
and management strategy. Similar to the Sun factory, the wage level was 
comparatively higher than some smaller factories in the area. The factory had 
contributed social insurance for all of the workers from the beginning of their 
employment. A contract was kept by each worker. The minimum hourly wage rate 
was basically observed, although workers' working hours were longer than the legal 
maximum. The factories operated in two shifts. The day shift was from 7.00 a. m. to 
7.00 p. m. with a one-hour lunch break from 11.30 a. m. to 12.30 p. m., while the night 
shift was from 7.00 a. m. to 6.45 a. m. with a forty-five-minute break from 11.00 p. m. 
to 11.45 p. m. Ordinary workers usually worked six days per week and their monthly 
income was from 1,000 to 1,400 yuan. But, unlike the Sun factory, ninety per cent 
of the ordinary workers were women, aged between eighteen and thirty, due to fairly 
light menial and skilled positions. Most of the production workers were from 
provinces of He Nan and Guang Xi while the skilled workers were generally from 
Guang Dong. 
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In both plants of this factory, the segregation of skill and gender was very 
apparent. Ordinary manual workers were called Yuangong (employees), while others, 
including managers, supervisors, engineers, technicians, and office clerks were 
called Zhiyuan (staff). Most of the ordinary workers or Tuangong' lived in the eight 
blocks of factory-provided dormitories. Eight or twelve workers shared a room. 
Inside each room, two electric fans, a bathroom, toilet and hot water heater were 
provided. Thirty yuan was deducted monthly from wages as rent. Until 2006, the 
factory subsidized by fifty yuan those production workers living outside. Skilled 
workers, supervisors, and managers received higher subsidies. The subsidy for line 
supervisors for example was 200 yuan. As a result, most of the skilled workers and 
supervisors lived outside the factory. Unfamiliar people not wearing factory 
uniforms were asked to show a factory ID card by the security guard to enter the 
factory or dormitories. Similar to the militant community, there were lots of small 
restaurants and comer shops that supplied food and goods at affordable prices. But 
unlike the militant community, the factory was situated within a better planned and 
developed industrial zone where local peasant-owned private houses were absent. 
Those living outside had to walk around fifteen minutes back to their homes in a 
nearby area. Even so, workers claimed: 'It is more convenient to live outside, 
especially when friends corne. ' 
Workers could choose to eat meals in the factory canteen or eat out. The 
factory ID cards had a digital function to record the number of meals workers took. 
Breakfast was one yuan while lunch and dinner were both two yuan. During hot 
days, workers would prefer to eat out. Some of them just stood beside the food stalls 
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to eat traditional bread and dessert while others sat in fast food restaurants to eat a 
three yuan dish. Many women workers did not have much appetite and preferred to 
eat a snack during lunch. However, the factory prohibited the workers from bringing 
snacks into the factory. Workers had no choice but to stand outside the factory 
entrance to finish eating things such as cake, plums, and tofu before they went back 
to work. Some brave women concealed their snacks in their umbrellas in order to 
bring them into the factory. One of them told me: 'I did not want to eat lunch, but I 
will be hungry in the afternoon. I prefer a snack, although indeed I am also very 
worried about being found out by the supervisor. ' 
In July 2005, when the n-dnimurn wage rate in Shen Zhen was raised to 580 
yuan, the factory adjusted the salary accordingly. Yet the Zhiyuan, whose salary was 
much more than the legal minimum, did not receive a wage increase. A department- 
based one-day strike by the machinery repair technicians then occurred in the 
engineering department and forced the factory to enhance their salary by 100 yuan. 
Very similar to the Sun factory, most of the technicians were middle-aged men who 
enjoyed lots of privileges that ordinary workers did not. 
Labour Intensification, Rationalization, and Grievance 
After two years of pay rises, the factory attempted to lower production costs by 
increasing the work intensity of Yuangong, and containing the overtime pay of 
Zhiyuan from late 2006. First of all, the work quotas assigned for each production 
line were increased steadily. Time is a key aspect of discipline control in industrial 
capitalism (Thompson, 1967). As usual, this control is parallel with a coercive time- 
piece in the Moon factory. If workers in the line could not finish the quota, their 
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lunch time the following day was shortened to do the unfinished tasks. The practice 
also created conflict between experienced workers with a higher efficiency and the 
inexperienced, as well as between the front-line supervisors, who announced the 
new quota and forced their subordinates to work faster, and the ordinary workers. 
None of the interviewed workers viewed the policy as violating the law. Staff from 
the engineering department came to record the speed of different lines or units and 
suggest new quotas. Some workers in positions not on a conveyor belt reported that 
they would co-operate with other workmates to lower their work pace collectively, 
but the assembly line workers always tried their best to speed up their work to avoid 
unpaid work the next day. As a result, 'too exhausted' rather than low pay became 
the most common cause for discontent in the factory. Many workers quit the factory 
after a few months or a year. 'The wage is fine, ' nonetheless accounted for many 
other workers staying on. To tackle the problem of the high turnover rate, the factory 
restricts the right of workers to resign. According to the law, workers can resign 
from a job with one month's advance notice. The management, nonetheless, gave 
only two 'permissions' for resignation in one production line per month. That meant 
workers had to queue up to quit. For those without proper 'permission', which 
workers called 'leave by oneself' (Zi Li) and 'immediate leave' (Ji Li), the factory 
kept part of their last wages and they were prohibited from re-entry to the factory 
within half a year. Concerning the resign restriction abuse, some wrote letters of 
complaint to the LSSB, but the LSSB officials just went to the factory office to talk 
with the management without any contact with workers. There was not any 
improvement. 
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One of the workers who was forced to Zi Li said: 'In this factory those on-work 
cannot eat, those off-work cannot sleep, only drink water and cannot eat food, fifty- 
five kilos [of body weight] when entering the factory is now reduced to forty-five, it 
is really exhausting, especially on the night shift. ' While many others like her were 
forced to Zi Li as they could not bear the working conditions physically, there was 
also an exception. Xiao Lan, a twenty-three year-old woman from Guang Xi who 
quit from the factory in late 2006 told me of her boldness and smartness: 
I had a row with our shop floor supervisors first. Then I walked to the 
administration department directly to see the director. I asked him on what 
ground the factory did not allow me to resign. The Labour Law well protects 
the right of workers to leave a job. The director said... 'You can resign 
every one can resign... who said you cannot resign?... You go back to work 
first. I will see. ' I then went back to work for several days. But there was still 
no news on my resignation. Then I left the workshops after the normal working 
time. The supervisor asked me to stay on... I objected... I said that the Labour 
Law said that overtime work is voluntary. My workmates all looked at me very 
surprised... He then let me go... The next day I went to see the director 
again... and finally they let me go without deducting any money. 
But workers like Xiao Lan were really rare. Most of the workers did not know 
at all that the policy of restricting their right to resign was illegal. Some did know 
but were not yet brave enough to speak out like Xiao Lan. 
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A second strategy for lowering costs targeted the Zhiyuan. In late 2006, the 
factory announced a policy to restrict the overtime working hours of the Zhiyuan. 
The policy was not implemented until March 2007. From July 2007, the maximum 
overtime hours of Zhiyuan were set at seventy-two per month. They did not receive 
extra pay even if they had worked more than that level. The impact for front line 
supervisors was that they had to take care of more lines when other supervisors were 
on leave. For the technicians, a smaller number was on duty in each shift. As in the 
Sun factory, as repair technicians only needed to work when a machine was reported 
out of order, some of them just left the factory after punching in their time cards and 
asked others to punch out for them. To constrain the abuse, a new punching machine 
was installed in the main entrance of the factory in August 2007 especially for 
Zhiyuan, with a CCTV monitor and security guards on duty. 
While a high production target and difficulty to resign were the two major 
grievances of Yuangong, and new restrictions on overtime work and attendance were 
main concerns of Zhiyuan, the problem of working in high temperatures applied to 
both parties. The electricity supply was often suspended in the city. When there was 
no electricity supply, the factory operated its own power generators but only for the 
basic functions of the machinery. Workers had to work in extremely high 
temperatures and, in some positions, among toxic smoke as ventilation facilities 
were not operated either. Some workers quit from the factory just because they could 
not bear the hot working environment. In the summer of 2006, a signature petition to 
the top management was initiated by some workers to ask for 'comfortable working 
conditions'. The content of the letter was: 
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A Signature Petition Letter to the Top Management in the Moon Factory. 
Dear factory leaders, 
Hello. We are staff of your company. Now we feel that we should reflect some 
conditions in our factory to company leaders. 
We have to work three to four days every week in a workshop without air- 
conditioning. As many staff work in a workshop and the machines in operation 
emit a great deal of heat, the workshop becomes very hot when we are working, 
but we have to work as usual. Such a production environment is extremely 
detrimental to our health. So we hope that the factory can provide us with a better 
working environment. 
The thing is that the supply shortage of the electricity company in XX 
causes a rotational power cut to industrial zones. Our factory is one of those 
subjected to a rotational power cut. A power cut would influence production to 
some extent. In order not to halt production, the factory uses a power generator. 
As the resource and capacity of the generator is not sufficient, the factory does 
not turn on the air-conditioning during the power cut. Also, no fans are installed 
in the workshops with lots of workers and high temperature machinery, such as 
tin soldering and bearing machines. 
We work in such an environment, and the factory does not reduce the 
production output and provide any facility to reduce the workshop temperature 
for workers. Many workmates resigned or even left the factory themselves 
because they could not bear such an environment. Staying in such a tedious and 
stuffy environment is very detrimental to us. The consequences can be 
imagined... 
Moreover, the leaving of workers would affect the factory production. 
Therefore, for the sake of our company, us, and our common interests, we hope 
the factory can provide us the workers with a comfortable working environment 
and satisfy our small request without affecting production efficiency. 
Signatures 
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Yet no significant improvement was achieved after this campaign. The long- 
term discontent of work intensification, difficulty of resigning, high temperature and 
so on mounted up to an across-factories strike in August 2007. Yet, the immediate 
causes of the strike related to the minimum wage policy of the city government. As 
mentioned, the city had significantly raised the minimum wage rate in July 2005 and 
2006, workers generally expected a similar pay rise in July 2007, but the 
government finally decided not to raise the minimum from that month. A strike was 
immediately sparked off the second day after the workers received their July pay slip. 
Organizing and Development of the Strike 
In-depth and follow-up interviews with workers showed that the strike was well 
planned at least from June by machinery repair workers with the assistance of 
supervisory staff. In order to maximize the chance of getting approval for their 
resignations, workers often stated something like 'mother is sick at home' to 
rationalize their application. But from June 2007, all of these applications were 
returned from line supervisors, who told workers that their shop supervisors asked 
them to write down reasons like 'there is no air conditioning in the workshop', 
'working conditions are too harsh', or 'work is too hard, and the wage is too low' on 
the application forms. Workers believed that it was a signal from the middle level 
supervisory staff to pressure the top management to improve conditions. 
Workers received pay slips for July on a Thursday in August. Workers' salary 
was not raised. Furthermore, technicians and supervisors found their income was 
severely reduced due to the overtime restriction. For example, one of the technicians, 
whose salary was always well over 2,000 yuan, only received 1,400 yuan. On the 
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evening of the Friday, when the managers who only work during the day had left the 
factory, a public letter was posted on the notice boards of all of the workshops. 
The letter was issued in the name of all of the Moon factory workers and 
entitled 'Voices from the staff and employees' (Zhiyuangong Xinsheng). It began by 
pointing out that the management had attempted to lower their salary from the end of 
2006, and now their income had been reduced by fifty per cent from the same period 
the previous year, while the work quota and living cost had doubled. 'We have 
reasonable demands', the letter stated: 
A Public Letter Posted out in the Workshops before a Strike in the Moon 
Factory (Extract). 
1. To adjust our current wage standard. We... well know the market wage standard 
now, and thus demand our wage to be adjusted to.... Yuangong, [employees] 1,500 
yuan or more; second level Zhiyuan, [staff] 2,000 yuan or more; third level Zhiyuan, 
2,500 yuan or more; fourth level Zhiyuan, 3,000 yuan or more; the above figures 
should exclude any subsidy. 53 
2. To raise the accommodation and food subsidy for those living outside. (Now rent 
and prices have risen to more than double last year, but our subsidy is still the 
standard of the end of the last century. ) 
3. To improve the welfare conditions, provide reasonable allowances for posts that 
are prone to high temperatures, toxic substances, outdoor work, and occupational 
diseases as well as providing regular occupational disease and body checks. 
53 The demanded wage standard was an expectation from workers on their monthly income, including 
overtime payment but not extra subsidies such as for accommodation and night shift worL 
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4. To provide night shift subsidy and snack allowance for those working on the 
night shift. 
5. The company should buy unemployment, maternity, hospital, and all of the other 
insurances requested by the labour law. 
6. To solve the hygiene problem of drinking water. 
7. To improve the fairness of the overtime work (... when normal working time has 
been exhausted, not only is the work target not reduced during overtime work, but 
also adds up to two persons' work to be performed by one person, in the name of 
controlling overtime). 
8. The trade union should function appropriately and its core members should 
include participation of grass-roots staff and employees (Zhiyuangong). 
The public letter ended by stating that the workers requested the company to 
answer these points in writing and they would not accept an oral reply from anybody, 
including the company CEO. No single word about a strike was written in this letter, 
but news began to circulate among the ordinary workers that the technicians would 
stage a strike soon. The letter was then torn down by somebody. Nothing special 
had happened over the weekend until the night shift technicians stopped work on the 
Sunday night. However, up to this moment, ordinary workers could not imagine 
what part they could play in this dispute between the Zhiyuan and the company. 
On Monday morning, soon after the first group of ordinary workers as usual 
walked to their workshops at 7.45 a. m. and prepared to begin work, the electricity 
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was suddenly turned off. There was one electricity control room in each building. 
Somebody had run into the control rooms and switched it off. Supervisors then told 
workers that there was a strike ongoing and asked them to leave the workshop. In a 
workshop of the wire department (workers called it the wire factory or Man Chang) 
where the strike first began, the gate was locked from outside before the workers 
walked out. Workers shouted from inside and somebody broke the lock from outside. 
When the other group of workers arrived at 8.00 a. m., workers in this workshop had 
run down to the ground floor. The newly installed punch clocks for Zhiyuan were 
found to be broken. Thousands of workers stood around the main entrance of the 
factory. The factory had a small branch located out of its main complex. The main 
gate of the branch was locked. Some of the workers attempted to climb up the iron 
gate to escape but were unsuccessful. The mass of thousands from the main factory 
then rallied to the scene shouting 'Open the door! ' The security guards then opened 
the gate and the hundreds of workers inside joined in the march. From the very 
beginning, the male technicians in the engineering department were directing the 
thousands of workers. 'A technician waved his work uniform [to attract attention] 
and several other technicians around him shouted: "Go! Go! " The workers then 
followed them in the direction they walked, ' workers recalled. 
After workers from the small branch joined in, the technicians then led the 
crowd onto a local crossroad by the same way, and ordinary workers just followed 
the direction led by the technicians and did not know where they were going until 
they arrived. The crossroad was not a busy location that many cars passed through. 
Several policemen just stood by peacefully with the workers. Some also talked with 
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workers in a friendly way. 'One policeman even told us that it was useless to stay 
there and we should go to the national highway (Guodao), ' a worker said. Half an 
hour later, the group walked to the national highway and occupied one half of the 
main road. Hundreds of official forces appeared soon, including patrol police, 
military police, transport police, and local government security guards, followed by 
LSSB officers, the residential district government (Jiedao Ban), Party Secretary- 
General, and the factory managers. The Party Secretary-General, a LSSB 
representative, and a top manager, speaking through loudspeakers, tried to persuade 
strikers to go back to the factory for negotiation. Government officials told them that 
it was illegal to stand there and anything could be discussed in the factory, while the 
manager asked the workers to elect representatives for negotiation. Some workers 
responded: 'We are all representatives, ' and 'We have no representative! ' A 
manager then asked several young men standing in the front of the march to be 
representatives, but he was mostly rejected. Some of them were too shy to reject 
directly and so followed the manager for a while, but then also turned back to the 
crowd. The technicians who had led the workers to the scene kept silent. Workers 
discussed with each other that in a strike some years ago, the negotiation delegates 
from the workers' side were all sacked after the strike. It was very clear that no one 
was willing to be a representative. After the failure of the 'persuasion' and more 
police arrived, the police began to drive off the workers. Some young workers in the 
front, most of them female, resisted and had some physical conflict with the police. I 
talked with Ling Ling, one of the young women workers from Guang Xi who were 
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in the front. Ling Ling was a nineteen year-old woman who looked very small but 
who had a strong sense of justice. 
Author: Were you scared when you were in conflict with the military police? 
Ling: Not at all. It was their mistake not ours! You know it was very peaceful at the 
beginning. Some of them [police] also joked with us. But suddenly they pushed us 
forward robustly. 
Author: Some workers were arrested. Did you think you might be arrested as well? 
Ling: I did not think of such a thing at that time. I was just angry. I could not think 
of anything ... I would not regret it even if I were arrested. 
The police arrested several of them. Workers then retreated to the pedestrian 
way and shouted: 'Release the people! Release the people! (Fangren! )' Some of 
them were released on the scene while others were detained for around one week. As 
police had taken control of the place, the workers just gathered around a petrol 
station and then dispersed peacefully. 
In the afternoon, the management called up all of the Zhiyuan to have a 
meeting. Most of the technicians and supervisors went to the meeting. However, as 
the factory requested those who attended to sign their names, almost all of the 
technicians and some supervisors left. Therefore, the meeting was basically held 
among department heads and managers. There was no formal notice but news was 
circulated that the meeting had decided to increase basic salary of Zhiyuan by 300 to 
500 yuan depending on position, and Yuangong by only thirty yuan. The supervisory 
staff were mostly satisfied with this offer and went back to work from the Monday 
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night. But no single worker followed. Workers punched their time cards in and out 
as usual and then left the factory immediately. 
On Tuesday, the strike continued. A notice was posted by the factory to 
formally announce the above salary package and some other concessions. A fifty 
yuan subsidy was granted to those living outside, including all workers. Night shift 
workers could have one yuan allowance per day. The managers and supervisors tried 
their best to persuade workers to go back to work. Some of them went to the 
dormitories. Many workers also had calls from their supervisors to ask them to 
return to work or provide information like who had returned to work. But ordinary 
workers began to recognize that the management had 'betrayed' them. Some of them 
pasted up slogans on the wall of the dormitory: 'Strike to the last mornend' Some 
others passed handwritten flyers to express their insistence on a strike and 
encouraging others to do so. Electronic messages by mobile phone were also 
circulated among the workers calling for the continuation of the strike. One of the 
workers, who was forced to go back to work in the evening, recalled her story. When 
she punched her time card out, her shop supervisor and department head stood by 
the machine. 
They asked me to work. I refused. They said that I could just sign my name. I 
thought that it was no problem if I only signed a name. I went into the 
workshop to sign my name. But afterwards, they did not allow me to leave and 
soon the gate closed. There were not enough workers to run a single line. 
Around ten workers just sat there for several hours with the lights on. After 
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several hours, we were allowed to leave and we got pay for the full day of 
eleven hours. I felt very upset. I thought I had destroyed the solidarity of my 
workmates. So I did not go back to work on Wednesday. I just slept in bed 
unhappily. 
In the evening, while the managers had 'successfully' persuaded workers like 
this one back to work, a well-typed pamphlet was circulated among the ordinary 
workers. Some of them were thrown down to the ground from the dormitory 
buildings; some were distributed by workers outside the factory. 
The pamphlet began by denouncing the Zhiyuan and calling for unification of 
Yuangong: 
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A Pamphlet Circulated during a Strike in the Moon Factory. 
All Yuangong brothers and sisters, 
We must be united. We don't need to care about those shameful Zhiyuan 
and don't believe their lies. They have achieved their own goals. We don't want 
to waste the time of both sides as well. We have very clear demands: if any of the 
following items cannot be accepted by the factory, we will definitely not walk 
half a step into the workshop. Our demands are: 
1. Basic salary 810 yuan. 54 Pay during holidays should also not be lower than the 
basic salary. 
2. No deduction of fees for living in dormitories; living outside should gain the 
appropriate subsidy. 
3. Night shift should have a night snack allowance of 150 yuan paid on a 
monthly basis. 
4. Give those workers in toxic and detrimental conditions an appropriate subsidy 
and subsidize the staff who work outdoors according to the Labour Law (150 
yuan). 
5. The drinking water of Yuangong should reach hygiene standards. 
If you want to be a piece of meat on a cutting board or a shameful Han 
traitor, then you can sell your body before we receive our wage demand! We 
believe absolutely none of us is this kind of person. Fellow Countrymen, it is our 
most fragile moment as those Zhiyuan have achieved their aims, and forgotten the 
interests of us Yuangong. Yuangong brothers and sisters from the whole factory, 
for the sake of our own interests, let's unite together. Chairman Mao said: 'Our 
revolution has not been successful yet, struggle should continue, [we] should 
wait, insist! Insist... and insist. 
From all Yuangong 
54 Here only the wage demand of ordinary manual workers was listed and the basic salary referred to 
the monthly wage for eight hours per day and five days per week. Their overtime pay would be 
calculated based on this rate. The basic salary of ordinary workers in most of the factories was not 
more than the legal minimum rate which was 7 10 yuan at the time of strike. It meant that the strikers' 
demand was 100 yuan above the legal minimum. 
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Encouraged by all of this, most of the ordinary workers continued to strike on 
the third day, although the management continued to persuade or deceive workers 
back to work. A significant moment happened at noon of the fourth day. The 
company posted a new statement to announce that those who resigned in three days 
could get back all of the compensation and wages immediately, others should go 
back to work. Workers who returned to work in three days could get an extra 
allowance: fifty yuan first day; thirty yuan second day; ten yuan third day. Otherwise, 
they would be seen as 'absent' and 'leave by themselves', implying workers could 
not get back their wage as usual. 
It was good news for many workers who were in the long waiting list to quit or 
preparing to resign. The strike bolstered some others' determination to leave. Three 
thousand were said to have queued up in the administrative department to apply to 
leave the factory. The divisive strategy fatally shook the confidence of the workers 
who still wanted to stay on the job, in particular, those with family economic 
pressure. When the supervisors phoned to ask workers to work again, they did not 
resist any more. Instead, workers had the impression from the new development that 
resignation or return to work was the only choice they could make. At the same time, 
the factory provided distilled water in both dormitories and workshops immediately 
and promised to install air-conditioners in workshops and spare a residential room as 
a common room with a TV set on each floor of the dormitories. The factory also 
promised a regular meeting with the supervisors and encouraged more suggestions 
from the ordinary workers. 
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Strike in a Sister Factory 
One of the significant features of this strike compared with the 2004 strike was that 
it happened almost simultaneously at the two factories in different towns. 
Technicians and, to a lesser extent, supervisors of the two plants were dispatched to 
each other from time to time. Therefore, workers said that the machine repair 
technicians of these factories knew each other well. The strike in the suburban sister 
factory was less organized and started later than, but with a similar development to, 
the main factory as described above. All workers there well understood that the 
strike had originated from the main factory. While workers in the main factory had 
more previous experiences, workers in the sister plant told me that there had not 
been any significant strike experience in their factory. There was no public letter 
posted on the Friday evening. The strike began on the Monday afternoon. The 
factory gate was locked up by the security guards after workers stopped work. 
Workers forced guards to reopen the gate by shouting. Hundreds of workers, who 
were much fewer compared to the main factory, gathered at a local crossroad and 
were soon driven off by the police. While workers in the main factory walked to the 
highway on the first day of the strike without a strong hidden leadership, workers in 
the subsidiary plant attempted to occupy the same national highway on the fourth 
day of the strike. 'They were even more radical but more dispersed and less 
organized, ' one witness to both sides told me. However, the concessions from the 
management on wages, subsidy, welfare, working conditions, and the proposed 
regular meeting with supervisors were exactly the same as at the main factory. 
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In an intemet forum for discussion of labour law and labour rights, a notice 
was posted dated 13 January 2005 by a worker from this factory. It showed that the 
struggle of the workers in this factory for the legal wage and social insurance was 
almost in the same period as the similar struggles in Uniden and the Sun factory. 
A Letter Posted on an Internet Forum Expressing Workers' Grievances. 
We are staff of xx factory in XX town, Bao An district. We are extremely discontented 
with the behaviour of the factory. But as a weak community (Ruo Shi Qum), unable to 
antagonize the factory at all, we can only seek your help here. 
As a supplier to Nokia, monthly export of Nokia mobile phone chargers from a 
single factory in XX (with factories in XY_X town and Beijing as well) is over four 
million. However, the Labour Law is not fully enforced in the factory; the factory has 
never bought pension and medical insurance. Moreover, no wage increase was initiated 
by the factory although the living cost rose. Two strikes were touched off because of this 
and finally forced the factory to raise wages. But by another means, the factory increased 
the basic wage (according to Shen Zhen city minimum wage), but cancelled the seniority 
allowance (staff who had finished one full year's work had been entitled to twenty-six 
yuan monthly subsidy before); bought social insurance for employees (supervisory level 
or above), but cancelled the original five per cent of monthly provident fund. 
Furthermore, the organizers of these two strikes were all dismissed with different 
excuses. 
In 2004, the factory established a staff welfare committee under some pressure or 
for some interest considerations, but even committee members, such a low position, are 
controlled by the factory. For example, the committee director is a relative of a 
production department head. Two days ago, several committee members planned to 
make a complaint to the labour bureau upon the request from the workers, demanding 
that the factory buy pension and medical insurances. They got signed support from more 
than 200 workers. However, these sorts of basic demand were still not accepted by the 
management. Several welfare committee members who were organizers were sacked in 
the night. Many people were affected. All of the supporters were warned or dismissed. 
We beg for help from experienced people. I give you gratitude here firstM 
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Here the workers elaborated their struggle in 2004 and 2005. Interviews with 
workers in August 2007 showed that the factory had bought pension insurance for 
workers. The question of the workers' welfare committees will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Seven, which will confirm the difficulty of committee members in 
resisting management pressure. This notice told us that a well-organized strike in 
2007 in which its leaders were protected was in fact a result of the accumulation of 
previous experience. 
After the Strike 
The factory then recruited new workers by extending the maximum age restriction 
from thirty to forty years old. Hundreds of young workers queued up outside the 
entrance of the factory in the mornings after the strike to apply for a job. Stress from 
the work quota remained the main problem for workers. The newly recruited 
workers were less experienced, so it was more difficult for their lines to finish the 
assigned work target. Many of the ordinary workers interviewed said that they 
would quit the factory before the Chinese New Year. 
Those who left the factory tried to apply for new jobs. Some other factories set 
up recruitment booths around the factory and specially pointed out that their 
conditions were better than those in the Moon factory. Some workers swore not to 
join a factory any more. Ling Ling and one of her friends, also from Guang Xi, 
became waitresses in a hotel in the second week of the strike. The monthly salary for 
the ten-hour working day was 900 yuan, much lower than working in the factory. 
But the women were happy with their new jobs as they were less stressful. 'We will 
never go back to a factory again, ' they told me. 
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A common discontent remained unchanged after the strike. 'Too exhausting 
the work target keeps on rising, if you can finish 1,000, they will increase to 1,200 
soon', they said. None of them thought of the possibility of collective bargaining 
with the management on the quota. Moreover, they thought that the work quota was 
designed by the supervisors. I reminded them that the supervisors might only be 
implementing the policy laid down by the top management. But almost all of them 
insisted that it was the supervisors' responsibility to make them work hard. One of 
the workers said: 
Those line supervisors are all very selfish... only for the sake of their own 
promotion... they keep on increasing our work tasks. Even slowing down a bit 
would arouse a serious denouncement from them... they themselves just 
walked around from here to there... what kind of contribution did they make? 
It is too unfair to us. 
The women production workers' perception of machinery repair workers, who 
were generally understood as the real leaders of the strike, was much better. The 
mechanics had nothing to do when the machines were working. As described in 
Chapter Four, they would go to talk or flirt with the women on the production lines 
from time to time. When the workers whose machines needed fixing came to the 
production line, whether to have fun with them or assist their work, the supervisors 
would condemn neither the repairers nor the women workers. However, production 
workers had a strong feeling that the machinery repairers looked down on them. 
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Despite these frustrations and divisions, after Xiao Lan told others her 
successful story of resignation, a worker from He Nan was inspired to do something 
more. She said that she would certainly be leaving quite soon, so she might want to 
do something good for the other workers, for example, to write a letter of complaint 
on the 'unbearable' work quota. 
The question of the trade union was repeatedly mentioned by active workers, 
firstly in an internet letter, then in the August Friday public letter. I asked the 
production workers if they knew there was a trade union in the factory before the 
strike. Some said they knew, others said not. Contrary to my expectation, Ling ling, 
the woman who had physical conflict with the police told me: 
Author: Did you know your factory had a trade union? 
Ling: I did not know. 
Author: Did you see the notice posted on Friday? 
Ling: Yes, I saw it. 
Author: Were you aware that the notice talked about a trade union (Gonghut)? 
Ling: Yes. But... I was thinking... it meant the workers (Gongren) gather together 
to have a meeting (Kaihui). 
Ling Ling had left home to Dagong for two years. But she did not have any idea of 
what a trade union was. Apparently, she was not aware that a trade union is an 
association, institution, or organisation. Rather, she perceived Gonghui (trade union) 
as just a meeting of workers, due to the lack of associational tradition in rural China. 
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However, after the strike, all of them developed a better understanding of the trade 
union, although all of them thought it was beyond their abilities to run a trade union: 
'We are just little Yuangong. We are not powerful enough to do things like that. No 
one will listen to [us]. ' 
Like the Sun factory strike in 2004, the knock-on effect of this strike was very 
obvious. Encouraged by their success, workers in many large factories nearby staged 
strikes or planned to do so. Management made concessions immediately after hours 
of stoppage or even before a strike formally began. 
I went with Xiao Lan to see her old friends in the factory. Although Xiao Lan 
had left the factory half a year before, she went back to see her friends in the 
dormitory from time to time. She had to borrow a factory uniform from a friend in 
order to gain access to the dormitory. But as a male, there was no way for me to do 
that. While in the Sun factory, it was machinery repair workers who took me into 
every comer of their factory and workshop, here in the Moon factory all in my 
networks were production workers, so none of them had the power to let me in. Our 
friendly talks were conducted in restaurants. I talked with them in groups with Xiao 
Lan and other friends we had in common. Despite some material gain, ordinary 
workers' perception of 'being betrayed' by the Zhiyuan was very apparent. Most of 
them did not think it was a successful strike. They always compared the 300 yuan or 
more salary rise of the Zhiyuan with their tiny thirty yuan. Some even emotionally 
said they were not willing to join any strike organized by the technicians any more. 
On I January 2008, when I revisited the workers, some of those who had quit 
from the factory during the strike had returned to work there again. One of the 
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workers told me that she had been hired to work as a warehouse clerk, but she was 
not confident to do the work. She thought the salary of the Moon factory fine and so 
came to work again. Another worker, however, enjoyed her job as a clerk with a 
1,500 to 1,600 yuan monthly income. But she also explained that not much money 
could be saved after spending on daily needs, which cost at least 1,000 yuan per 
month. The rent, for example, had risen to 500 yuan for a two-room flat. 
Those staying at the factory had to work even harder as the factory could not 
employ enough workers after thousands quit during the strike and the work quota 
kept rising. Workers in a semi-finished product department told me that New Year's 
Day was their first rest day after the strike as the factory could not hire enough 
workers. Their counterparts in the finished product department were luckier, but also 
could only enjoy a few rest days two months after the strike. The work targets 
continued to rise. One of the workers told me that when she joined the factory in 
November 2006, the quota of one of the products was 500 per day. It was increased 
to 530 before the strike, and 550 in October, which had not been reached so far. 
Moreover, the workforce was cut and some production lines were combined. For 
example, in one of the workshops, there were two lines with thirty-nine workers 
each before the strike. Now eight people were cut from each line and the remaining 
sixty-two workers joined together to work in the sarne line. But the previous work 
targets for the two lines were added together to produce a new quota for the bigger 
line despite the number of workers having been reduced. The work tasks of 
machinery repair workers also similarly increased due to the restriction of overtime 
work. In parallel with work intensification, workers' salaries were again 
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considerably increased from October 2007 as a result of the minimum wage rate 
adjustment. By then, the average monthly income of an ordinary worker was as high 
as 1,800 to 2,000 yuan. 
Formulation of a New Legal Minimum Wage 
During the strike, there were some rumours among the workers that the LSSB did 
not want the factory to increase the wage on a large scale as workers in other 
factories would follow and raise similar demands. There was no evidence to support 
this claim. It was more likely a strategy from the management to sidetrack the issue. 
However, another 'rumour' among workers was proved true three months later. 
Many workers told me that the city government would increase the minimum wage 
soon. From I October, the inside SEZ minimum wage was increased to 850 yuan 
and the outside wage to 750 yuan. Again, the inside rate was more than Shang Hai 
which was 840 yuan at the time and became top in the country. It was announced 
that the rates would be effective until 30 June 2008. To formulate this minimum 
standard, as in the past two years, the government launched a web-based survey of 
13,801 people in about 1,000 enterprises and a paper survey of 17,000 persons in 
1,100 enterprises. The survey collected 30,974 valid questionnaires. References 
were also extended to the minimum wages in competitive cites like Bei Jing, Shang 
Hai, Tian Jin, Jiang Su, Hang Zhou, and Guang Zhou. But unlike the previous two 
years, alongside the municipal State Property Management Committee, the 
SZMFTU, and general chamber of commerce, which were stated by the law to have 
a consultation right in the formulation of the new minimum wage, the LSSB officials 
from the districts of Bao An and Long Gang were also invited to the seminar to give 
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opinions on the new wage package (Jing Bao, 8 October 2007). It is to be noted that 
Bao An and Long Gang were the two most industrially intensive and strike-prone 
administrative districts in the city. 
Concluding Remarks 
Inspired by Steinberg's (2003: 486) approach to cross-fertilize 'historical 
institutionalism and historical materialism' in the study of the 'politics of 
production', this chapter tried to connect the two social processes of wage politics 
in Shen Zhen, the formation of a legal minimum wage by the municipal government, 
and the development of a cross-factory workers' strike for a reasonable wage. Here 
the politics of wages was an example to explore the changing politics of production 
in China. The special attention to wages rather than other interest bases was because 
the wage remained an essential, although not exclusive, focus in workers' struggle. 
Day to day discontent was embedded in work intensification, discipline, OHS, and 
the working environment. The articulation of these grievances in collective action, 
however, always surrounded the issue of the wage. No strike happened only because 
of air-conditioning or the work quota, for example, although they were long-term 
complaints of workers that caused many to quit. Moreover, to increase the work 
target was in fact a response of the management to maintain surplus value in a 
competitive global market upon the rising local wage standard. We saw that 
alongside a shortage in the labour market, it was industrial conflicts and state 
regulations that worked together to push upward the wage rate. The relationship 
between the labour market, industrial conflict, and legal institution is discussed 
below. 
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Based on her fieldwork in the 1990s and early 2000s, Lee (2007a: 24) argued 
that 'given the large labor supply, the prevalence of unskilled and low-waged jobs, 
and the non-existence of independent unions, Chinese workers can hardly be 
described as having much marketplace, workplace, or associational bargaining 
power'. In this thesis, empirical data from 2004 has repeatedly challenged this 
notion of Lee's. Skilled workers in particular were not in fact in 'unlimited supply' 
when the economy was in the process of rapid growth (Lewis, 1954). In this chapter, 
the rising market bargaining power was again evidenced by workers' confidence to 
quit, especially after a strike, their capacity to gain new jobs and the local state's 
pressure to increase the minimum wage for the local economy. Worker's market 
power also had the potential to strengthen workers' confidence in the exercise of 
workplace and associational power. Workplace bargaining power was uneven, the 
supervisors and technicians had more power than the ordinary workers. It was not 
only because they were more 'scarce' in the labour market, but also their position in 
production and powerful influence in the workers' community, as shown in Chapter 
Four, provided them with more organizing resources. On the second day of the strike 
in the Moon factory, ordinary workers also tried to organize themselves. But their 
organizing resources were significantly weaker than those of the supervisory and 
skilled workers. The former could only encourage workmates to continue the strike 
by distributing pamphlets in dormitories and streets as well as sending mobile phone 
messages. Tbey did not have leeway on the shop floor, while the supervisors and 
technicians did. The uneven distribution was also applicable to the associational 
bargaining power. The workplace trade union did not have any function during the 
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strike and so not any evidence of associational power. We could conclude that 
workers' associational power was fundamentally weak due to the management's 
manipulation of the workplace trade union. However, the hidden organizers of the 
strike and drafters of the Friday-night public letter, who demanded rank-and-file 
representatives in the trade union committee, clearly had more consciousness on the 
question of association than the ordinary workers. Even Ling, the woman who 
showed a higher extent of justice and courtesy, did not have any idea of what a trade 
union was before the strike. Moreover, in the case of the Sun factory, I elaborated 
the role of informal networks in the organization of the strike. In the Moon factory, 
we could identify an image of a more mature network acting underground to plan 
and push forward the strike: for example, the perfectly timed and well-presented 
public letters posted in all departments on the Friday evening, and the almost 
simultaneous strike in two factories. This was built on previous struggle experience 
in 2004 and 2005, 
Although the factor of the labour market should be highlighted, the wage is yet 
not only a reflection of the labour market in an orthodox economic sense, but also an 
effect of class struggle in a political sense (Friedman, 1977). Here I brought out the 
role of workers' subjectivity and state legal institutions in the politics of wages in 
particular and the pattern of workplace relations in general. 
Reasons for my highlighting workers' collective subjectivity were threefold. 
First of all, as shown in this chapter, the fon-nulation of a new minimum wage 
partially took workers' actions into account as well as the shortage of labour. The 
implication was that legal institutions always constrain but also are actively 
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reconstructed by the pattern of workplace struggle. The cyclic relationship is: 
workplace struggle4legal institution reform4 new pattern of workplace struggle-) 
a new round of institution reform. Second, as far as the labour shortage was 
concerned, the key challenge for the management was the high turnover rate or wave 
of quitting. After the strike, for many consecutive days, hundreds of workers queued 
up at the factory entrance and waited to join the factory. But this did not mean 
workers would work there for long. In the face of a high turnover rate, factories had 
to compete with each other to recruit and keep workers and the wage was one of the 
essential criteria for workers to choose a job. Quitting was an individual decision 
which was constrained by factors such as family economic pressure and the 
availability of other job opportunities, but sometimes it was expressed collectively. 
Workers' individually quitting from a factory was already a problem for the 
management. It explained the illegal policy of the management to restrict the 
workers' rights to resign and the local state's ignorance of the behaviour. But the 
more problematic challenge for management was that workers resigned from the 
factory in a wave of thousands. The factory allowed workers to do so because of fear 
of the continuation of the strike. Third, the Moon factory case showed that workers, 
especially the supervisory and skilled workers, were able to strive for a wage 
standard higher than the legal minimum by their collective actions. This form of 
protest might be more common without the prompt response from the state to 
enhance the legal standard. Lee concluded that 'decentralization, cellular activism, 
and legalism' were characteristics of protests of all social groups, including migrant 
workers (Lee, 2007a: 236). This conclusion was not confirmed in this study. It 
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reminded me of the importance of the historical dimension in workers' struggle. 
Legalism was just an institutional tool workers used to protest for their interests in a 
specific historical context. As soon as the law was basically enforced, and their 
interests could not be reflected within the law, workers might ask for more than the 
law, as in the 2007 strike. It is unambiguous that their struggle is interest-based, 
rather than rights-based, as Lee preferred. 
The regulatory role of the state in workplace relations was illuminated by 
Burawoy (1979; 1985) in his prominent concept of the 'politics of production' or 
'labour regime'. He categorized two kinds of labour regime in capitalist industry, 
'market despotism' and 'hegemony' depending on the extent of intervention from 
the state as well as a 'bureaucratic despotic regime' in the socialist state. As the 
ownership and management has restructured to come to terms with global capitalism, 
the Chinese state's administrative hierarchy has not been involved in the internal 
management of enterprises, at least not in the private sector, so the concept of 
'bureaucratic despotism' is invalid in post-socialist China. Burawoy (1985: 12) 
refers to 'market despotism' as 'the state is separated from and does not directly 
shape the form of factory regime', and 'hegemony' as 'the state shapes the factory 
apparatuses by stipulating, for example, mechanisms for conduct and resolution of 
struggle at the point of production'. The Chinese state is now more and more 
actively intervening in workplace relations. The niinimum wage policy is just one of 
the examples. As Steinberg's (2003) supplementary to Burawoy revealed, a labour 
regime is in fact embedded in a changing context of legal institutions. Along with 
the 1994 Labour Law, which provided significant leeway for workers' struggle, in 
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2007, three significant laws were legislated, namely the Employment Promotion 
Law, the Labour Contract Law, and the Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration 
Law. The second strengthens workers' individual and collective rights, while the last 
intervenes more actively in the resolution of labour conflicts by either the workplace 
or judicial mechanisms. Does it mean the labour regime in China is on the way to 
'hegemony'? Without an effective workplace trade union and a shop steward culture, 
however 'effort bargaining', which was defined by Burawoy (1979: 161) as 'the 
monetary reward for labor expended or the reward for effort', took the form of 
industrial conflict and through the local state regulation of the minimum wage, while 
coercion is still dominant in the management of ordinary workers. Therefore, 
'despotism' rather than 'hegemony' is appropriate to portray the labour regime in 
China. To solve this dilemma, Lee (1998) conceptualized the foreign-owned factory 
as 'localistic despotism'. However, in the case of the Sun factory, I argued that the 
resource of 'locality' was not always in the hands of the management in a changing 
context of labour market and workers' struggle. In this chapter, we continued to see 
that the 'locality' as a base of control in the workplace was not obvious. Women 
ordinary workers' complaint of being 'betrayed' by the supervisory and skilled 
workers was based on production position: Zhiyuan, rather than their original place. 
Therefore, I prefer to portray the workplace relations in post-socialist China's 
integration into the global economy as a changing labour regime. Because despotism 
is still prevailing whilst the state's intervention and workers' collective actions are 
more and more actively pressing the management, I refer to the factory regime at 
this stage as 'contested despotism' which potentially gives way to a new form of 
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power balance in the future, developing from R. Edwards' (1980) notion of 
'contested terrain'. 
Burawoy (1979: 179) suggested two 'motor[s] of change: 'class struggle' and 
6capitalist competition' in the transition of a labour regime in advanced capitalism. 
As I emphasized in the discussion of workers' market bargaining power, the 
expansion of global capitalism into China, indeed driven by the deepening of 
advanced capitalist competition since the mid-1970s, is one of the main factors 
contributing to the transformation of workplace relations in recent years. Both 
management and the local state competed for workers with their rivalries. Shen Zhen 
formulated its minimum wage with reference to other industrial cities. 
Neighbourhood factories set up recruitment booths to promote the claim that their 
working conditions were better than the Moon factory's shortly after the strike. 
Therefore, 'capitalist competition' remains a valid factor to explain the 
transformation of the labour regime in globalising China. However, Burawoy's 
concept of 'class struggle' is not fully satisfactory to grasp the social and political 
process of labour regime transition in post-socialist China. By 'class struggle', 
Burawoy (1979: 179) adopted a narrow definition of 'between the organized 
representatives of capital and labor - namely management and Union'. In China, the 
official trade union, especially in the workplace and the local levels, so far has not 
represented workers in a way its western counterparts did. At the central level, the 
ACFIU did have a positive role in the formulation of the Labour Contract Law (K. 
Wang, 2008), and even in Shen Zhen, trade unions were reported to defend workers' 
rights and interests more actively (CLB, 2008). However, as Clarke and Pringle 
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(2007) pointed out, these progressions were a result of internal political pressure 
from the Party-state as a response to the rising form of workers' activism. 
As Burawoy (1979: 178,179) rightly put it: 'Struggles on the shop floor are 
largely shaped by conflicts between different levels, and among different factions, of 
management... In the normal everyday life of the shop floor, workers are not 
organized as a class. ' In the Sun factory, we saw locality-based conflict was 
dominant, and in the Moon factory, divisions were on the base of production 
positions: Zhiyuan versus Yuangong. However, as far as industrial conflict was 
concerned, demands were ambiguously targeted on the interest concession from 
capital. It is arbitrary to argue that all of the workplace conflict had a class nature, 
but even under Burawoy's definition, workers' struggle in China shared a nature of 
6class struggle'. He distinguished three levels of 'class struggle': economic, political, 
and ideological. For him, economic and political struggles are to 'reshape or 
maintain the distribution of economic rewards... and the relations in production' 
respectively, while ideological struggles 'take us beyond capitalism' (Burawoy, 
1979: 177,179). Ideological struggle was not witnessed in this study and political 
struggle was also not very potent, but Chinese workers' struggle had exerted a sound 
impact on the policy of local authorities, the reform of the official trade union, and 
the labour legislation of the central government and in turn reshaped 'the distribution 
of economic rewards' which was Burawoy's (1979: 179) perception of 'economic 
class struggle'. 
To underline the specificity of class struggle in post-socialist China, I call it 
'class struggle without class organization'. The limitation of this form of class 
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struggle is that it is more effective on the economic aspect of effort bargaining 
around the issue of the wage, but less effective on the political struggle of 'the 
relations in production' (Burawoy, 1979: 179). Certainly, there was significant 
confrontation from the supervisory and technician staff over the rationalization 
targeted on eroding their autonomy and control power. But it was a defensive 
resistance which could only slow down but not eventually bring an end to the reform. 
A proactive strategy of gaining more control or autonomy on production was absent, 
not to mention an internal labour market and internal state that post-war US workers 
achieved through the trade union's participation in collective bargaining (Burawoy, 
1979). In fact, this end is hardly achievable without effective workplace 
representation. It accounts for why a 'contested despotic' labour regime was not 
advanced to 'hegemony', although a legal framework for this transition is available. 
In the next chapter, I will provide an account for why an effective workplace 
representation could not be installed in China with a study of international civil 
society's effort to facilitate workplace democratic organizations. 
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Chapter Seven 
International Civil Society, Chinese Trade Unionism and 
Workplace Representation 
Attention is not only given to formal unionism: labour activism through 
organisations not usually classified as 'industrial' - especially non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) - is also examined, as well as the '(dis) 
organised responses of workers outside anyformally constituted body. 
Hutchison and Brown (2001: 2) 
Introduction 
Western labour scholars have underlined a significant role of class organization in 
the formation of class-consciousness and class solidarity (Hobsbawm, 1984; 
Katznelson and Zolberg, 1986; Clarke et al, 1995). In China, as we witnessed in the 
previous chapters, the question of workplace trade unionism has always been a 
central concern during major workers' strikes. In Chapter Three, we saw that a 
'temporary trade union' was formed during the strike by Yong Feng workers in 1994 
but declared 'illegal'; workers more ambiguously listed the establishment of a trade 
union as a key demand in the Uniden strike in 2004. In Chapter Five, like their 
counterparts in Uniden, some skilled workers in the Sun factory also recognised the 
significance of a trade union. However, in both the Uniden and Sun factories, the 
trade union established after the strike remained management-controlled. Worker 
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activists took part in the union election in Uniden and won, but they could not resist 
the pressure from the management and soon resigned. In Chapter Six, strikers in the 
Moon factory asked for rank-and-file representatives to be included in the existing 
union committee as an effort to reform the trade union. However, the demand was 
not properly addressed by the management. Management manipulation of the 
workplace trade union has remained a key barrier to the implementation of collective 
consultation and has given rise to wildcat strikes as a more prevalent channel to 
improve workers' wages and working conditions (Clarke et al., 2004; Clarke and 
Pringle, 2007), as we have seen in the previous chapters. Turmoil in workplace 
relations has forced the ACFTU to launch historical unionization campaigns in 
foreign- and privately-owned enterprises since 2006. 
On the other hand, the absence of freedom of association (FOA), one of the three 
core labour rights in the ILO conventions, is a major drawback of Chinese trade 
unionism which is criticized by international trade unions and NGOs. The new 
social movement unionism thesis has suggested that collaboration of different social 
forces at the global level, in particular trade unions, NGOs and progressive political 
parties, is essential for social change in the age of globalisation (e. g. Waterman, 
1999; 2001; Munck, 2002). Waterman (2001: 153) for instance, called for the trade 
unions to go 'beyond internationalism' to 'global solidarity' by integration with new 
social movements, including the women's, peace, ethnic, ecological and consumer 
movements which have emerged in the industrialized countries since the 1960s. He 
argued forcefully for 'the necessity for the existing labour organizations, national 
and international, to convert themselves into a global social movement around work' 
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(Waterman, 2001: 206). Empirical studies of new labour organizing strategies have 
also reminded us of the specific role of NGOs in Asian NICs (Hutchison and Brown, 
2001). Within this trend, CSR rose into the spotlight for academics, policy makers 
and trade unionists as a new alternative to guarantee the basic rights of workers in 
the developing world. However, the implementation and monitoring of CSR practice 
has remained problematic (Pearson and Seyang, 2001; Whitehouse, 2003), 
especially in China, where FOA is absent (D. 0. Chang et al., 2004). This chapter 
explores the complexity of the implementation of workers' representative 
mechanisms and their dynamic relationship with the state, trade union and civil 
society. 
Codes of Conduct and FOA in China 
Pressed by consumer campaigns in the USA and Europe, TNCs in the West 
introduced corporate codes of conduct for their suppliers in the developing countries 
from the early 1990s. Some of the social movement organizations have recently 
adopted a more co-operative way of engaging in CSR campaigns. For example, a 
number of MSIs have been formed by leading retail corporations, trade unions, 
campaign groups and NGOs as benchmarks in western countries to promote CSR, 
such as the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) in the Netherlands, the Ethical Trading 
Initiative (ETI) in the UK, the Social Accountability Initiative (SAI) and the Fair 
Labor Association (FLA) in the US (Pearson and Seyang, 2001). The practice of 
CSR was launched in China in the mid-1990s (Pun, 2005b). As Pearson and 
Seyang's (2001) study showed, sixteen of the main twenty codes of conduct in the 
world include a clause for FOA. As a result, in order to demonstrate their 
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compliance with the code, some suppliers set up trade unions in their factories. 
However, as Pun's (2005b; 2005c) study revealed, the trade unions specially set up 
for CSR social audits in the PRD barely functioned at all, while those in the YRD 
did have some useful functions. The director of a factory commented on their trade 
union, in which all committee members were management staff and the chair was a 
representative from the city level industry trade union federation and a Party 
member, in this way: 
We see many good sides to having a trade union. We won't worry about letting 
workers be organized. If the workers have their own organization, they could 
organize leisure and welfare activities according to their liking. It is good for 
boosting productivity if the workers are happy working in my company. They 
can work faster, you know. 
(Pun, 2005c: 28) 
As we can see, the best practice of the trade unions that were formed to satisfy 
CSR social audits were typical state socialist trade unions whose main activities in 
the workplace were to encourage labour discipline and productivity by organizing 
production campaigns and social events (Clarke, 2005a), while many others did not 
have any function at all. This kind of trade union is not a 'real' trade union in the 
western sense, so international trade unions and labour rights organizations could not 
be satisfied that FOA had been implemented in this way. To push the 
implementation of FOA forward, some TNCs and MSIs initiated pilot projects in 
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China, as well as in other developing countries, to look for sustainable models of 
democratic workers' representative mechanisms in the workplace. 
In one of the ground-breaking pilot projects beginning from 2000, Hong Kong- 
based independent organizations were invited to provide training for workers in two 
shoe factories supplying a leading sportswear company, one in Shen Zhen, followed 
by another in Fu Ban province. In both factories, a democratic election was held to 
produce the union committee. However, the pro-labour Hong Kong NGO staff's 
involvement in the training of the ACFIU rank-and-file aroused attention from both 
the official trade union and the management. In the Fu Ran case, the local ACFTU 
branch ruled out the participation of the Hong Kong trainers from the very beginning, 
while in the Shen Zhen factory, the project was stopped by new factory management 
in 2002, implying that the Hong Kong trainers were not allowed to work with the 
trade unions. Trade union committees existed in both the factories. 55 My fieldwork 
in late August 2007 in the region encountered a strike by workers in the Shen Zhen 
factory to protest against the intention of the factory to relocate production to 
another city and downsize the workforce without proper compensation. Some 
activist workers came to seek help from an independent NGO in the district and 
complained that their trade union was 'pro-management'. 
The ACFTU's stance made TNCs, MSIs, and their NGO working partners 
change their strategies in 'implementing' FOA in China. A Hong Kong labour NGO 
: 56 trainer in the shoe factory pilot project shared with me his experience 
55 Anita Chan conducted deep evaluation into this case, see A. Chan (2007). The above information 
was also drawn from interviews with trainers of Hong Kong-based NGOs and reference to their 
training reports. 
56 Interview, II March 2006. 
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Our first experience [in the pilot project of trade union training] was very 
successful, we spent many resources. You know, we even rented a flat near a 
factory so that the trainers could have good contacts with the trade union 
officers. The factory is big, there are 4,000 workers, and all of the trade union 
officers, except the president who was appointed by the management, were 
elected in a well-planned election under our monitoring. Members were very 
enthusiastic, especially the vice-president. Unfortunately, the success story was 
discovered by the international media, then the ACFTU was aware of that, and 
we were forced to terminate the project. In one of the factories, soon after we 
[the trainers] withdrew, the vice-president quit from the job to join a social 
audit company... She used what she had learnt from our training to pursue her 
own career interests... To avoid political trouble, we began to think that the 
alternative committee model was more sustainable and practical. 
As the trainer said, after the intervention of the ACFrU in the project, 
practitioners compromised with a new strategy to address the issue of FOA in China 
by facilitating the establishment of a workers' committee, welfare committee, or 
OHS committee. This new model was being applied generally when I first began my 
fieldwork in 2005. Many TNC brands and almost all of the main MSIs in the West 
were proposing committee pilot projects in China. 
The next section aims to provide an examination of this new development 
through the case of the Star factory, where I had participated as an NGO trainer. On 
the one hand, I will see if there is any significant difference of the new model from a 
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workplace trade union. On the other hand, by removing the factor of inhibition from 
the higher level trade union, I will try to look into more structural barriers and 
possibilities embedded in the dynamic social relations of the production regime, 
labour market, society and the state. 
Background of the Factory and Welfare Committee 
The Star factory in Shen Zhen was owned by a Taiwanese person. The factory was 
established in the early 1990s, and settled within a tiny walled industrial estate. The 
estate was owned by a collectively-owned local villagers' company under the 
community government. 57 As a common practice, to monitor the factory, the 
community government sent in a local Party Committee member to be a so-called 
'Chinese side' director. In reality, the 'director' did not have any specific duty in the 
factory except communicating between the factory management and the local 
government. 
The only member of staff from Taiwan was the factory GM, while the factory 
owner also came to visit the factory from time to time. The management of the 
factory was highly paternalistic. The GM intervened in every detail of the 
administration and management, although a director was assigned to be in charge of 
the routine production. The basic unit in the structure of the factory was a division. 
57 The peasants with Hukou in rural villages were all allocated a piece of farming land after the 
reform in 1978. Rapid industrialization from the early 1990s dramatically transformed the farms into 
industrial land. The industrial zones were all developed by village governments and rented out to 
FIEs and POEs until the mid-1990s, when larger factories were allowed to 'rent' a piece land for 
thirty years with a lump sum price to develop in their own capacity. The urbanization policy granted 
the rural population the status of citizenship, and the villages were then renamed as communities. The 
communities also settled some migrants who gained the status of permanent citizenship by 
purchasing a house or getting a proper job within their territories under a quota system run by the 
state. However, the new citizens were not entitled to the rental income of the land and industrial 
estates. Share companies were set up to collect the rents and other incomes and distribute them to 
previous villagers. 
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Within a division, its head co-ordinated a number of group leaders who supervised 
the work of ordinary workers. 
Inside the factory grounds, there were three production and two dormitory 
buildings. Until 2001, each of the production buildings was called 'one plant' in 
workers' daily life, and the working conditions in the three plants were exactly the 
same. From 2001 onwards, the three plants were combined into plants A and B, and 
the employment conditions of the two plants varied from each other. The wage 
standard in plant A was enhanced for the sake of the social audit from the buyer 
TNCs, while plant B was left as a factory hidden from audit and the wage remained 
unchanged. As the nature of work in the two plants was basically the same, workers 
in plant B felt a sense of unfairness and staged a short strike to protest against the 
unequal treatment. The strike was unsuccessful, but the issue of equality between the 
two plants remained as a base of solidarity among workers in plant B and a source of 
conflict between workers in the two plants. 
The factory was persuaded by one of its buyers to participate in a pilot project 
of management and workers' training intended to result in the establishment of an 
elected workers' welfare committee. A Hong Kong-based pro-labour NGO was 
invited to provide training for workers and management by a western MSI, but the 
buyer who brought the factory into the project did not actively participate in the 
training process. 
Before the training began, the only grievance channel was a suggestion box. 
The GM responded to some of the complaints in his regular meetings with the 
director, division heads and group leaders, but replies to workers who filed the 
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complaints were not guaranteed. Some workers made complaints to the LSSB from 
time to time. The LSSB officials came to the factory to investigate. The owner of 
the factory told me of one of the cases in September 2005: 
They came after a worker phoned them to complain that we did not abide by 
the law. I told the investigators: 'Of course there are some factories better than 
our factory, but at the same time there are also many factories worse than us. If 
you can point out one factory that fully obeys the law, we will follow [it]. 
Please go back to tell your head [that] if the labour law is strictly enforced, all 
of the factories in the region will shut down. 
The training project lasted from 2004 to 2006. At the beginning of the project, 
there were 700 workers in the factory. The number was reduced to 500 at the end of 
2004 as the factory relocated part of its production to an inland province. The first 
year of the project was to facilitate the formation of a welfare committee, while the 
second year was for training the committee members. 
During the year, a series of talks and workshops were held for all of the 
workers as well as the management staff, covering the themes of globalisation, ILO 
fundamental labour standards, consumer movement and CSR, labour laws, OHS, 
management-worker communication skills and so on. A survey on workers' generic 
concerns and grievances was conducted and found that the wage was the first 
priority of workers. Afterwards, an organizing group for the welfare committee was 
formed by members from both the management and the workers. The workers in the 
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group were recommended by other workers or themselves during a group discussion 
in the training session with facilitation from NGO trainers. The organizing group 
was assigned to discuss the form, composition and function of a workers' 
representative body and facilitate its birth. In the name of the organizing group, a 
factory-wide direct election of the welfare committee members was held. The group 
agreed that management staff, including group leaders and division heads, would be 
excluded from candidacy as committee members. In China, the Trade Union Law 
stipulates that all wage bearers are members of trade unions, and this in practice has 
led to the management staff's dominance of trade union committee positions, 
especially the union chair (Clarke et al., 2004; Cooke, 2005; A. Chan, 2006a). The 
exclusion clause was suggested by the trainers to eliminate this abuse and made the 
comn-dttee more like a 'real' workplace representative body in the West. Workers 
were divided into twelve constituencies according to work groups and divisions. All 
ordinary workers were allowed to nominate themselves or other colleagues as 
candidates. One representative was elected from each constituency by secret ballot 
with the facilitation of the trainers. 
The second year involved consciousness building, skill training and personal 
follow-up of the committee members. The trainers provided twelve sessions of 
training on topics such as minute-taking skills, team work and internal 
communication, internal division of work, complaint handling procedures and 
collective bargaining skills. After the formal training ended, the committee was 
supposed to function as a representative mechanism to channel workers' grievances 
to the management, and trainers continued to provide advice and support for the 
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work of the new committee. The discussion in this chapter is mainly on the 
operation of the committee, which my fieldwork was based on, more than the 
preceding training process. During the seven months, the training team, of which I 
was a member, paid ten visits to the factory and maintained close informal contacts 
with workers. The following section outlines how the committee operated and what 
were the impediments in the way of its functioning role of channelling workers' 
grievances, as we observed them. 
Operation of the Welfare Committee 
After the training session, the trainers and core committee members held a working 
meeting with the manager. In the meeting, the GM permitted the committee 
members' request to allow trainers to continually support them. He promised a 
monthly regular meeting with the committee members and a regular time slot for the 
members to hold their own meetings. But he insisted that working proposals of the 
committee should have approval from him or the director. Hong, the Chair, Deng, 
the Vice-Chair, and Ma, a committee member, were the most active and outspoken 
members in the meeting. 
Two weeks after the end of the training programme, the committee held its 
first meeting, and the trainers were invited to attend. In the meeting, the members 
reflected that some workers showed intolerance to the committee as the committee 
members enjoyed much paid time off work for training and meetings but had not so 
far actually addressed workers' concerns, especially the problem of low wages. As 
soon as the question of wages was raised, a prolonged conflict between workers in 
plant A and B was manifested. A member from plant A mentioned that the better 
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working conditions in their plant was reasonable as the 'quality' of workers was 
higher than in B. Her opinion sparked off fury from workers in plant B. One of them 
said: 'Let's race with each other, to see whose skill is better. ' 
To consolidate support from rank-and-file workers, and co-ordinate opinion 
conflict between workers in the two plants, members agreed to conduct a factory- 
wide survey on workers' opinions about wages. Three days after the questionnaire 
was finalized, Hong, the Chair, presented the questionnaire master copy to the GM, 
who then took it away and never returned it to her. Hong and another member, who 
were assigned by the committee to make copies of the questionnaire, then felt 
pressure from both sides: the GM and other committee members. They told the 
trainers that they wanted to resign. The trainers suggested solving the issue at the 
next meeting. However, during the whole of the next month, workers, including the 
committee members, were required to work overtime in the timeslots scheduled for 
meetings with the explanation that there was a rush for a deadline. One month later, 
the GM told Hong that the questionnaire was problematic and could not be 
distributed. 
The operation of the committee was at a dead end until the trainers had an 
informal meeting with the members. Many members criticized the Chair for 
allowing the GM to read the questionnaire. They also expressed a constraint in 
running the committee: 'Without you [trainers], they [the factory] would ignore us. 
Mr. XX [the GM] would not keep his pron-dses at all. ' When the members discussed 
the workers' main grievances in different divisions, conflict took place again. Hong, 
who worked in plant A, said that the GM had promised to pay a transportation 
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subsidy for workers in her division but never fulfilled his promise. Deng argued with 
her that working conditions in Hong's division had been very good, so there was no 
point in demanding that the factory pay for their transport fees. 
The trainers urged the manager to convene a meeting with the members. The 
members were then cheered up again. One week before the scheduled meeting, the 
members held a pre-meeting to consolidate a consensus and agenda with the GM. It 
was the first time members had a meeting without the trainers' presence. As the GM 
was not in the factory, members then obtained consent from their group leaders to 
hold the meeting within working time. The meeting seemed to be very effective. 
Members were advised by trainers to collect grievances of workers in their division 
and report back to the meeting. They did a very competent job, listing concrete 
points that generally concerned workers. For instance, the workers living outside the 
factory hoped they could take drinking water in the factory back home. Workers also 
expressed their aspiration to improve the food quality and did not want to clean the 
floors of their workshops after overtime work, and most importantly, demanded a 
shortening of the working hours. One of the members prepared good minutes on all 
these points and planned to raise the issues at the meeting with the GM. 
However, the GM came back to the factory and denounced the members, 
especially the Chair, for failing to get his approval in advance. Moreover, the GM 
met personally with the Chair and rejected most of the points in the minutes. The 
morale of the members then fell again. Some even suggested dissolving the 
committee. In the face of the crisis, the trainers intervened and mediated between the 
two parties in their scheduled meeting with the GM: on the one hand, to advise the 
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committee members to try to arrange meetings on Sundays and inforrn the GM in 
advance; on the other hand, to encourage the GM to fix a time slot for committee 
members' meetings. The GM only stayed in the meeting for half an hour. After he 
left, many members were outraged: 'We did not want to be window dressing [of the 
factory] and get nothing from taking part in the game. ' Workers understood that it 
was a game because the factory needed the committee to convince their buyers that 
their practice was good. 
One month later, representatives from one of the factory's main buyers came to 
visit the factory and meet with the committee members. One week before the 
meeting, the GM called up the members and warned them not to reveal the reality in 
the factory. As an exchange, he made a promise that the factory would offer a 
special bonus for those who had worked for more than half a year. In the meeting, 
Deng and Ma were the two most outspoken and rebellious members. 
In the morning of the next day, one of his colleagues and good friends told Ma 
that their division head said that the factory would sack him. He had learned the skill 
of making models from a craftsman who had been a designer in the factory for one 
year. It was this teacher who introduced him directly to plant A of the factory. In the 
afternoon, he received a phone message from his mentor: 'You should do better; 
don't make so much trouble; don't let me down! ' Ma, then, went to talk with his 
division head. The head clearly told him that he had better not speak so much, 
otherwise the factory would dismiss him. At midnight, he went to the home of his 
mentor, and promised him that he would not make trouble again. 
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A similar message was also delivered to Deng. However, Deng still thought 
that he would not stop voicing concerns about the wages to the buyer's 
representatives, and criticized the setback of Ma one day before their meeting with 
the buyer's representatives. 
On the day, one hour before the scheduled meeting time, Deng and Ma were 
sent by the factory's Chinese-side director to the office of the local government 
joint-stock company that owned the industrial estates, where the two members were 
asked questions about their work in the committee. Meanwhile, the GM specially 
called a member who had been promoted to be a group leader and not attended 
committee meetings for a period of time to join the meeting with the TNC's buyers, 
at which it was agreed that factory management would not be present. First of all, 
this previous member told the buyers that their salaries were all paid in accordance 
with the law. Members were more passive than at any other previous meetings. 
Deng and Ma, who had just returned from the community government director and 
arrived at the meeting late, presented some positive achievement of the committee, 
followed by many other members. 
One month after this meeting, it was the Chinese New Year festival. The GM 
convened a meeting with the committee members to present a small gift to each of 
them and promised to raise wages in some divisions in which wage rates were the 
lowest. However, the overall standard of wages, especially in plant B, was still lower 
than the minimum legal rate. 
After the New Year, it was estimated that about 150 workers quit their jobs 
soon after resuming work. Ma found a job in another factory where the wage was 
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even lower but he thought he had better prospects to learn skills. Deng also planned 
to resign and go to another city to work with his younger brother. But the factory 
suddenly transferred Deng from plant B to A, so that his salary was increased from 
16.5 yuan to more than twenty yuan per day. He was criticized by other members as 
'self interested', as he was either absent or kept a low profile in the meetings in the 
aftermath of his promotion. 
Actually, it was uncertain whether the wage adjustment after the New Year 
was an indirect concession to the committee or a strategy to keep workers in the face 
of the high turnover rate in the factory. The trainers did not intervene in the 
operation of the committee any more, after the project ended two months after the 
New Year. The committee, although being called for meetings by the managers from 
time to time, seemed to be more passive or, in the words of workers, 'a flower vase' 
(meaning a mere decoration). 
Limitations of the Welfare Committee 
As can be seen, the achievement of the committee was very limited. After the 
withdrawal of the training team, quitting of its most active member and promotion of 
some others, it was in fact dysfunctional. In terms of its functions in the workplace, 
it was not much different from many other trade unions and workers' committees in 
China's private sector (Pun, 2005b; Sum and Pun, 2005; A. Chan, 2006a). It is to be 
noted that, unlike the trade union project mentioned above, the ACFrU local 
branches did not intervene in the welfare committee, but the fates of the workplace 
democratic representative bodies seemed to be very similar. My experience in other 
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projects and wide discussion with trainers in other organizations confirmed that the 
sustainability of the committee or trade union is always a problematic issue. 
To be sure, some models and projects were more successful than others, in 
terms of the impact of training and election on the immediate enhancement of wages 
and working conditions. For example, in one of the projects, the factory 
management urged the trainers to delay the schedule of a lecture on labour law and 
labour rights, so that they could increase wages to the level of the minimum wage 
rate beforehand. The factory was worried about the immediate outrage of workers 
once they understood their legal rights from experienced trainers, especially when 
the TNC buyers were present. However, it was generally hard to sustain the 
committee upon the withdrawal of the external support from the labour NGO and the 
pressure from management on its active members. 
Factors Handicapping the Capacity of the Welfare Committee 
First, the patron-client relations between the local state (and local villagers) and the 
business, which is structurally embedded in the legacy of the socialist state, hinders 
workers' activism. This was especially apparent considering the special meeting 
arranged for Deng and Ma on the date they met the TNC buyers. Local villagers, 
especially the cadres and Party members who act as managers or directors in the 
villagers' joint-stock company, benefited from the rental income from the factories. 
Some of the cadres or their relatives also gained extra salaries for being appointed as 
directors in one of the factories. For grass-roots state departments, including the 
Labour Station at the residential district (Jiedao, equal to town) level, and the LSSB 
at district (Qu, equal to county) level, their incomes are dependent on the local state 
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budget. Before 1995, a single tax system was adopted in China, and all of the tax 
income would be sent to the central state and then be redistributed to the local state 
from the top down. Under this system, the taxes collected by the local state revenue 
department did not contribute directly to the local budget. As a result, the local state 
officials were hesitant to collect the tax and rendered losses of national revenue. The 
central government then introduced a dual tax system by separating national tax and 
local tax. The national tax is dependent on the value-added in the production chain, 
while the local tax is dependant on gross profit. The system encouraged provinces 
and cities to compete for foreign or domestic private investment at the cost of lower 
environmental and labour standards. The tax reform in 1995 can be seen as a 
symptom of the internal contradiction of the state. In other words, as socialist 
ideology was eroded, the capacity of the upper level government to control its 
subordinates was also weakened. It can also explain why the rule of law is hard to 
realize in China (Lee, 2007a); the difficulty of implementing the labour law and 
trade union law in the private sector is just one example, The scenario was even 
worse considering many hidden interest-exchange or corruption cases that were 
prevalent in the country. 
Second, as global capitalism is in rapid expansion in China, the workers, 
especially those who are young or with more skill, find that quitting is a better way 
to secure their own interest. For example, as Ma could get a better job in the other 
factory, he would not stay in the factory and seek a collective way to improve his 
own situation. Although the manager did not really punish or dismiss him, he felt 
pressure to stay in the factory. The extent and nature of the shortage of labour has 
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been discussed in previous chapters, and was further witnessed in this case. In the 
Star factory, hundreds of workers quit during two periods of time, namely Chinese 
New Year and the peak season of the industry. As at the Uniden, Sun and Moon 
factories, responding to shortage of labour and rising labour cost, the factory set up 
two branch plants in the provinces of Jiang Xi and Jiang Su. The expansion of 
capitalism is a double-edged sword for workers' activism. Although it might 
encourage the confidence of some workers such as Ma, it also made quitting a 
common strategy, which is detrimental to sustainable organization in the workplace. 
Others with a weak market position, for example Hong and Deng, were too 
vulnerable to resist threats or co-option from the management. Hong was a woman 
in her late thirties and the main breadwinner of a family with two sons at school. Her 
husband, whose wage was one-third lower than hers, worked at a garment factory as 
a general auxiliary worker. Deng was a slightly disabled man with low skill. It was 
too costly for both of them to lose their jobs. Chinese workers are in the struggle of 
voice, exit and loyalty, in the terms of Hirschman (1970). Labour market and family 
status were two considerable factors influencing workers' choice of strategies. After 
voice, Ma chose to exit while Hong and Ma stayed back out of loyalty. In any case, 
voice has become a more common strategy for migrant workers than before. 
Third, the personal network is prevalent and exploited by the factory as a 
control strategy. According to State Council research (SCRO project team, 2006), 
60.37 per cent of the migrant workers in the country acquire their jobs through 
personal networks of kinship and locality. They are very often introduced into the 
factories by senior staff. Ma, for instance, was introduced by his mentor, a craftsman 
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in the factory, and benefited from the mentor's personal relations so that he could 
work in plant A. His mentor was a key person used by the manager to put pressure 
on Ma. After the New Year, the GM manipulated a by-election of three committee 
members because of the promotion and resignation of previous members. I had a 
deep discussion with one of the new members who had been very outspoken and 
active in the meeting, and found that both of his parents had worked in the factory 
for a long time. Hong, who had been working in the factory for more than ten years, 
wanted to bring her husband into the factory, but he was rejected by the GM as he 
was too old and less skilled. Deng was introduced to the factory by his aunt-in-law 
who still worked in the factory. Walder (1986) saw the institutionalization of an 
interpersonal dependent culture as a way of control in the workplace in communist 
China with his powerful concept of 'communist neo-traditionalism'. Although the 
mode of production and personal relationships in the workplace are totally different 
in FIEs compared to SOEs, the personal network of patron-client relations was in 
fact embedded in both pre-capitalist culture and state-socialist traditions and so is 
still prevalent in contemporary global factories. The culture could be eroded and 
phased out by reform of recruitment practice and rationalization of management, as 
we saw in the case of the Sun and Moon factories. Similarly, in the Star factory, 
personal introduction alone was insufficient to provide a labour supply. The factory 
hung out a banner on the wall of its grounds to advertise job vacancies through the 
year. 
Fourth, workers' solidarity is dislocated by the management strategy of 'divide 
and rule' to control workers. Wage scales differed from plant to plant, division to 
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division, and even from one worker to another. There were lots of interest 
differences in the workplace between workers in plants A and B, between 
experienced workers and new workers on the production line, and between 
supervisors and committee members. The group leaders hated the activities of the 
committee as, when the members left the workshops to attend meetings, they had to 
replace the positions of the members in the production line. The trainers suggested 
that the factory employ 'substitute workers' to resolve the conflict, but it was 
rejected by the GM, although both the committee members and group leaders were 
excited by the suggestion. As will be elaborated below, the effect of a signature 
campaign in the handmade division for higher wages was weakened by the failure of 
workers from other divisions to join in. A base of solidarity was hard to identify and 
articulate in the day-to-day experience of workers. Workers will only act together 
when they perceive that their own interest is in line with others (Fantasia, 1998). To 
most of the workers, the primary reason for them to stay in work was to earn a living 
and escape hardship in rural villages. In the case of Deng, although he was a person 
with a strong sense of justice, he was pacified after he was transferred to plant A. As 
human beings, workers always struggle between the material factor of self interest 
and the moral factor of social justice (Kelly, 2002). But to be sure, a stratum of 
workers who were able to commit to class interest still needs time and struggle 
experience to forge itself. 
Fifth, the external support for workers is weak. )NUle the committee was 
reliant on the support and advice of the trainers, the trainers' role was restricted. On 
the one hand, the NGO only worked in the factory on a project basis. Without 
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external funding and permission from the factory, trainers could not provide long- 
term support. Moreover, if the trainers fim-fly stood up for the interests of workers, 
then the factory would not allow long-running involvement of the NGO. More 
structurally, NGOs in China do not have a legal position to represent workers and 
facilitate the establishment of workplace organization independently from their 
employers. TNCs are even in a paradoxical position to support workers (Pun, 2005b) 
because of the fundamental conflict of interest over price. In an informal dinner after 
an MSI conference on 13 November 2005, a supplier manager complained that full 
compliance with the code would increase cost: 'The market is highly competitive. A 
little rise in price would make us lose the order. ' As a response, an ethical trade 
manager of a TNC stressed price pressure in their merchandizing practice: 'Price is 
powerful! We should take a balance between quality, price and ethics. ' According to 
the Trade Union Law and the newly implemented Labour Contract Law, the role 
should only be played by the higher level ACFI`U branches. 
To conclude, the limitation of the welfare committee was because of the power 
imbalance between workers and management. Workers were divided and 
inexperienced and lacked external support, and so preferred individual ways of 
living and struggle. These characteristics made them too vulnerable to resist the 
management's pressure and co-option. The management, by contrast, could exploit 
the locality interest networks in the community and the factory to pressure the 
workers, as we saw in the Sun factory before 2004. 
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Impacts of the Welfare Committee 
Despite their fundamental weakness, the training project and welfare committee had 
some positive impacts on the workers' experience. 
First of all, the announcement that wages were to be raised in the manager's 
meeting with committee members before the New Year, although they did not yet 
fully satisfy workers as well as the law and CSR code. The factory kept a certain 
amount of wages during the New Year holidays to prevent workers from leaving the 
factory without notice, seven days for plant A and twenty-five days for plant B. The 
GM, in this meeting, also announced that plant B would be reduced to ten days. Fifty 
to 200 yuan of bonus was promised earlier to workers who had served half a year or 
more. 
Second, the food was improved slightly as a result of the demand and 
participation of the committee. The manager requested the members to monitor and 
participate in the food purchase in the mornings. The factory paid five yuan per day 
to the member on duty. However, some of the members were reluctant to join in. 
After the New Year, the canteen provided three kinds of food instead of two as 
before, although my observation found that the food was mostly vegetables. 
Third, the most successful achievement which was appreciated by both the 
manager and the workers was a National Day cultural party. The event was proposed 
by the committee members and supported by the management. 5,000 Yuan was spent 
on the party joined by a total of 300 workers. My observation and interview during 
the party found that ordinary workers enjoyed and truly appreciated the work of the 
welfare committee. 
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As the 'concessions' from the management were quite insignificant, the 
achievements of the committee should not be overestimated. Apart from the 
concerns raised by the committee members, other factors, like a shortage in the 
labour market, some extent of external resources from the TNC, and the 
management's aim to drive up productivity, also contributed to these 'achievements'. 
However, during the training, workers staged at least three collective protests, which 
were very effective in pressing the management and so were positive in workers' 
experience. 
A strike was staged soon after a talk on Labour Law had been delivered by 
NGO trainers. A routine factory abuse was delayed payments, from twenty to forty- 
five days, depending on plants and divisions. Workers were told by the trainers that 
it was not lawful for the factory to delay payment for more than seven days. It was 
the first time that workers had heard this information. Discussion of the issue arose 
among workers. The factory financial officer was forced to announce that the factory 
would improve the policy and as a first step the electronics and the handmade 
divisions (originally forty-five days overdue) would be paid on the same day as the 
sewing division (thirty days overdue). However, the promise was not kept; workers 
in the electronics and handmade divisions were not paid on the same day as the 
sewing division the following month. The workers in the former two divisions were 
frustrated and agitated. On the date when the sewing division was paid, they stopped 
working but stayed in the workshops after a period of chaos. The GM went to the 
workshops and asked all of the 150 strikers to go down to the ground floor and 
queue up. 'He reprimanded us and asked if we wanted to work or not. No one 
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answered. But then some of us began to move [back to the workshop]. A short strike 
was ended so', one of the committee members recalled. The problem did not change 
until the factory reduced the overdue days from forty-five to twenty for all of the 
divisions in plant B fifteen months later. 
During the committee member training, a number of anonymous workers filed 
a complaint to the district LSSB about the factory's infringement of the Labour Law 
on delayed wage payment and long working hours. The GM then called a meeting 
with the committee to discuss the issue. He invited members to express workers' 
grievances. Members voiced four areas of discontent. First, workers had to attend a 
morning assembly every day. The time spent in the assembly was not counted as 
working hours, while workers were subjected to a penalty if they were late for the 
assembly. Second, there was little choice of food and the hygiene was bad. Third, if 
workers could not finish their work target during normal working hours, they had to 
work overtime without payment. Fourth, penalties in the factory were generally 
heavy. The result of the meeting was encouraging. The GM promised to change the 
regular morning assembly from a daily basis to a weekly basis and provide more 
options of food. 
At the end of the formal training programme for the committee members, Deng 
and another member from the handmade division of plant B, where the wage rate 
was the lowest in the factory, organized a signature campaign in their division 
asking for a wage rise. More than thirty workers signed the letter. They handed the 
letter to the GM at the concluding training session when he was present. The move 
forced the manager to make a promise on wages in the meeting so that most workers 
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in this division gained a wage rise from the next month. Those who earned ten yuan 
per day were promoted to thirteen yuan and similar rises from twelve yuan to 13.5 or 
fourteen yuan, thirteen yuan to fourteen or 14.5 yuan, fourteen yuan to fifteen yuan, 
fifteen yuan to sixteen yuan, sixteen yuan to 16.5 yuan, but those with a higher daily 
wage from seventeen to twenty yuan remained unchanged. This victory encouraged 
the committee members' decision to hold a factory-wide survey to further voice 
workers' wage concerns. The survey was obstructed by pressure from the GM on the 
Chair. 
From these experiences, we could see that the welfare committee did have 
some long-term impacts. For the workers' side, through training, meeting and 
activities of the committee, they learned their legal rights and organizing skills and 
gradually enhanced their organizing capacity. From an unorganized strike without 
immediate success, to a collective complaint from which a non-wage concession was 
gained, to a well-organized and tactical signature campaign by which wage rises 
were achieved. When this step-by-step process of organizing advanced toward the 
factory-wide wage survey in the name of the committee, it was halted by pressure 
from the manager. Afterwards, internal conflict arose and workers' confidence 
collapsed. For the side of management, they joined the voluntary project of 
establishing a committee for a number of reasons. First, the presence of a committee 
could show their buyers that 'good practice' had been performed, as told by workers, 
the pictures of committee events were always shown in the factory audit from the 
customers. Second, the committee organized social activities to improve workers' 
sense of belonging, productivity and length of stay in the factory. This point was 
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repeatedly expressed by the GM in his meetings with buyers, trainers and comn-dttee 
members. Third, the committee could express ordinary workers' concerns that 
otherwise would go to the LSSB or give rise to a strike. However, the management's 
aspiration was to make the committee entirely under management control, rather 
than function as a 'real representative body' of workers capable of challenging 
management, which was the aim of the external trainers. 
In the light of these changes, the welfare committee model was not much 
different from traditional state-socialist workplace trade unionism. What made the 
externally imposed committee different from a traditional trade union was the 
knowledge and expectation of workers. As we saw in the cases of the Uniden, Sun 
and Moon factories, even though there was a trade union committee in the factory, 
most of the ordinary workers did not know it existed nor had little expectation from 
it. In the words of a female worker in the Moon factory, her understanding of a 
labour union (Gonghui) was 'labourers gathered together in a meeting'. In the Star 
factory, however, the labour laws, ordinances, CSR codes and other labour rights, 
along with the organizing skill to achieve these rights, were delivered to workers in 
classroom-based lectures and small-group workshops as well as informal contact 
between trainers and workers. With all of these expectations and knowledge in mind, 
as soon as ordinary workers thought that the committee was not able to protect their 
rights and interests, they would lose trust in the committee; as soon as the committee 
members' attempt to voice the workers' rights and interests was hindered, they also 
felt frustrated, lost confidence and then retreated to the individual strategy of 
quitting. 
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State, Trade Union, and NGOs 
As Chang and Wong (2005) suggested, the meaning of the western-based consumer 
movement and its attached CSR projects was to create opportunities for workers' 
organizing on the ground. In this sense, international civil society did have a role in 
linking up workers' struggle in their workplace and community and the moral 
movement in the west. However, in China, official trade unions continued to act as a 
Party-state apparatus and were reluctant to work with international organizations in 
workplace organizing, while the independent NGOs which worked closely with 
international civil society also could not be eventually immune from the leverage of 
the Party-state. The social and political development after the rise of the labour 
shortage and strike wave since 2004 imposed new challenges on both the official 
trade union and independent NGOs. 
Pun (2007) suggested three kinds of legal status of labour NGOs in the PRD. 
Some survived under a 'patronized' partner such as the ACFTU or a university 
institution; some were registered as a business unit; while the others operated 
without any registration. The example of the Chinese Working Women Network 
(CWWN), which was set up as early as 1996 as the first labour rights NGO in the 
PRD by a group of scholars, students, social workers and feminists in Hong Kong, 
shows that there is not any legal channel for the group to achieve registration in the 
mainland. CWVvIN sought different state departments at provincial and municipal 
levels to affiliate under their umbrella. Finally, a joint project in the name of 'Nan 
Shan Women Worker Service Center' was launched by CWWN and the district 
trade union federation. CWWN's early work focused on empowering women 
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workers in their service centres or workers' dormitories by providing legal and 
gender education. CWWN paid the trade union a service fee in exchange for the 
trade union officials being on-duty in the centre. The rise of the anti-sweatshop 
movement and CSR in the West as well as the general concern over development 
and poverty in China created more opportunities for NGO activism in the PRD from 
the late 1990s. In 2003, a newspaper reported that ten labour NGOS58 had emerged 
in the PRD within one year and most of them were funded by foreign foundations 
(Zhongguo Jingyingbao, 5 December 2003). Like the CWWN service centre, some 
of the labour NGOs were initiated by Hong Kong-based NGOs, while the others 
were set up by mainland intellectual activists or workers that built up connections 
with the foreign foundations at a later stage. Sponsored by TNCs, MSIs, charities 
and international trade unions, labour NGOs extended their activities from 
community-based service centres to factories by trade unions' or workers' 
committee training and social audit projects, public spaces in industrial zones (e. g. a 
mobile van project) and hospitals (e. g. an industrially injured workers' network). In 
2004, CWWN co-operated with a local branch of the Chinese Communist Youth 
League to set up a new service centre and its projects were expanded to include a 
women workers' co-operative shop, a 'women's health express' mobile van, an OHS 
community education centre, an industrial injured workers' network, a factory 
workers' committee training programme and a legal advice hotline. 
2005 was however a turning point for the optimistic expansion of the foreign- 
funded labour NGOs in the PRD. From that year, the government had strengthened 
58 It was estimated that the number of labour NGOs in Guang Dong province was over sixty in 2007. 
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monitoring and constraint on the work of NGOS. 59 The NGO's semi-official working 
partners, the ACFIU district branch and the Youth League in the case of CWWN, 
withdrew their partnership after being subject to pressure from the state. Those 
which registered as a business unit were also challenged on the grounds that the non- 
commercial nature of their activities did not comply with the terms stipulated in their 
registration. Some were forced to close while others continue to run under stricter 
monitoring from the local state. The survival difficulties of labour NGOs had further 
undermined the possibility of continued support for workers' committees under the 
CSR project. 
On the other hand, the state intervened more actively in both CSR practices 
and workplace organizations. In 2005 China announced its own CSR standard 
CSC9000T, initially only for the textile industry, which is similar to the 
internationally accepted SA8000 standard (A. Chan, 2006a). Since 2006, the 
ACFIU, supported by the state authorities, launched a historic unionization 
campaign, beginning with giant TNCs like Wal-Mart (A. Chan, 2006b; 2007). 
Usually it is the local town-level Party-state officers who go to factories to request 
the management to set up trade unions. It is not legally compulsory, but the factory 
managers are vulnerable to resisting state pressure for interest considerations. In my 
interview with a factory owner in Long Gang district of Shen Zhen, where the Star 
factory is situated, he complained of pressure from the residential district (Jiedao) 
government pressing the factory to form a trade union and Party Committee. From 
the middle of 2006, officials from the residential district government went to the 
59 One of the explanations for this policy change was the rumour that the Tolour Revolutions' in the 
former Soviet Republics had given rise to worries in the Chinese government that the foreign-funded 
NGOs would be pushed by anti-communist forces to stir up social unrest (K. M. Chan et, al 2005). 
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factory to talk with its executive manager. The response from the factory was to set 
up a Party Committee in late 2006 but it resisted establishing a trade union. However, 
by the middle of 2007, the pressure from the state for unionization was increasing. 
The factory owner said in December, 2007: 
They [the residential district government officers] come to visit us many times. 
They said that it was the government's policy to request enterprises like yours, 
with more than 1,000 workers, to set up a trade union. The [residential district] 
secretary-general also phoned our managing director to talk on the issue. We 
are within their sphere (Zai Tamende Dipan), it was very hard [to refuse]... 
Now the government does not fear rich people, they fear poor people. China is 
different from other countries. In the West, it is the rich people who influence 
politics and the government fears the rich. Now in China, it is the rich who fear 
the government and the government fears the poor. The poor have a high 
potential to threaten social stability and social order. The government now is 
mostly afraid of losing control. But they do not fear the boss. Some years ago, 
the government tried its best to attract foreign capital. Now it gets lots of 
money. Tax revenue has been quite sufficient... The country itself has too 
much capital and savings. They do not care if foreign capital moves out. 
'Me government officers told him that relatives of the boss cannot be the trade 
union chair. Even so, in the factory, a factory director was assigned to be the trade 
union chair, which in the understanding of the factory owner did not violate the state 
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policy. The policy of the local ACFTU is 'have [a trade union] first, and 'be like [a 
trade union] later. The strategy can certainly achieve the unionization rate target set 
by the higher level of the trade union, but provides few cases of successful trade 
union representation. Alongside forcefully pushing workplace unionization, the 
SZMFIU also became more active in the community. In October 2007, the 
SZMFTU held a meeting with sixteen labour 'civil agents' (Gongmin Dailpo) and 
NGO activists to show appreciation for their work and discuss the possibility of 
integrating their work into community-based trade union legal rights centres. 
However, one of the conditions that some of the activists could not accept was that 
they could not contact overseas media or receive foreign funding. 
Concluding Remarks 
As we have repeatedly seen in the cases presented in this thesis, unstable labour 
relations in China today make a stable representative mechanism in the workplace 
very essential. The high rate of turnover, wildcat strikes and administrative 
complaints as well as the escalating number of labour dispute cases bring a 
'problem' to the state and a 'trouble' for the employer. The state needs a trade union 
to mediate labour-management disputes, the employers need a trade union to 
improve productivity and stabilize the high labour turnover rate and stoppages, while 
the workers need a trade union to express their grievances. The traditional socialist 
trade unions cannot perform these functions as the workers do not trust a union in 
60 According to the law, workers can be represented in court by a trade union or their relatives under 
the system of 'civil agent' (Gongmin Daili). Some workers with legal experience and practical 
knowledge chose to earn a living by helping other workers in legal cases against the employers. They 
helped prepare documents and even represented claimants in court and charged a service fee. As a 
service fee is widely regarded as improper, they are sometimes hailed as 'black lawyers'. 
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the arms of the management. Therefore, democratization of workplace organization 
is necessary. 
However, as the Star factory case and other similar projects revealed, 61 
democratization is by no means sufficient to make a workplace organization 
effective. The management-labour relationship is highly imbalanced. While workers 
are extremely divided and inexperienced, the management exploit personal interest 
networks inside and outside the production regime to divide and control workers. 
For the sake of effective workers' organization, external support is essential. Support 
from NGO trainers, MSIs and TNCs were insufficient as all of the CSR projects 
were short-term and both NGOs and MSIs do not have solid legal and ultimate 
political ground in the authoritarian regime of China, not to mention the business 
interests of TNCs, which are contradictory to workers' organizing power. A. Chan 
(2007: 15) put it this way: 
Even in societies that have well-established trade unions and trade union 
cultures, much time and efforts are needed to set up workplace trade unions 
and after that to ensure they have the competency to bargain with management. 
Moral and practical support and prolonged training by higher-level trade union 
organs are normally needed. 
Accordingly, A. Chan (2007: 15) argued for 'the necessity for trade union 
involvement' in the CSR projects. However, the ACFIU is still resistant to working 
with overseas-sponsored NGOs to prevent independent labour organizing and there 
61 Including the TNC facilitated trade union election project, which A. Chan (2007) has presented. 
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is no sign of successful workplace organizing, as we saw in Shen Zhen. The barriers 
to workplace organization were indeed beyond the factory and embedded in the 
development of state, economy and society. 
China is experiencing dramatic social and economic change today. Workers' 
wildcat forms of struggle and unstable labour relations in the workplace seem to 
exert an impact on both state policy and ACFIU strategy (Clarke and Pringle, 2007). 
A campaign is ongoing from the ACFrU with strong state support to set up 
workplace trade unions in FlEs. As A. Chan (2006b; 2007) pointed out, the active 
strategy and way of organizing trade unions in Wal-Mart superstores was 
unprecedented. The new Labour Contract Law, effective in 2008, is also expected to 
enhance both workers' individual rights and powers of workplace trade unions. All 
of these reforms provide a new context for workers' activism and organizing 
capacity. 
Thus, the transition of China into global capitalism is very different from the 
West. The legacy of socialism guaranteed a strong state-manipulated trade union and 
weak civil society, resembling the older generation of East Asian NICs in the 1970s, 
especially South Korea and Taiwan. Thus, the potentials and limits of workplace 
organizing capacity followed the unique path of social and economic development in 
the later capitalist countries. The attempt of international civil society to reshape 
workplace relationships in China cannot be successful easily without a strong 
national and local foundation. The complexity of state-trade union-NGO 
relationships in contemporary China defies the optimistic elaboration of the new 
social movement unionism thesis on a 'global solidarity' in the new millennium 
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(Waterman, 1999; 2001). To be sure, independent labour NGOs can play a 
supportive and stimulating role in workers, activism. However, more attention 
should be paid to the development of the state development strategy, which is in turn 




Conclusion: Workers' Struggle and the Changing Labour 
Regime in China 
Introduction 
The new international labour studies was different from and could not be 
reduced to industrial relations, trade union studies, labour history or the sort 
of technical studies carried out by bodies like the ILO... Within peripheral 
capitalist countries scholars were concerned with the process of 
proletarianisation, the nature of workers' struggles. 
Cohen(1991: 10) 
This study has examined the formation and transformation of migrant workers' 
struggles and industrial conflicts in China, situated in its first SEZ, Shen Zhen. In 
Chapter One, I laid down my research puzzle on the potentials and limitations of the 
new working class during China's integration into global capitalism in the past three 
decades. In Chapter Two, I drew fruitful insights from a wide range of labour studies 
traditions before resting on the nature of migrant workers' struggles and the 
historical process of class formation, inspired by the paradigm of 'new international 
labour studies' (Cohen, 1991). By reviewing the previous literatures on China labour 
studies, a key contest was generated: what is the specificity of labour politics in 
China? Post-structuralist, culturalist, and political economy-orientated 
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institutionalism provided competitive answers. I tried to break through the limits of 
orthodox disciplines and undertake a coherent scholarship by connecting local 
politics with global force (Burawoy, 2000) and micro-empirical reality with grand 
theories (Strangleman, 2005). Inspired by the labour history tradition, Chapter Three 
provided a review of labour conflicts in Shen Zhen from 1979 to 2004 as a 
background to my ethnographic engagement from 2005 to 2008. In Chapter Four, I 
drew insights from gender, culture, and community studies to explore the social 
process of a migrant workers' settlement community, Militant village, in Shen Zhen 
and its impact on the labour process and power relations on the shop floor. Apart 
from the extensive scope of social relations: gender, place and its attached gangster, 
age, and skill, special consideration was paid to the formation of industrial 
masculinity as a prelude to the investigation of the role of male skilled workers in 
workers' strikes. In Chapter Five, a strike case in the Sun factory, a Taiwanese- 
invested enterprise in Militant village, and its influence on its sister factory in the 
neighbouring city of Hui Zhou was studied at length. My discussion started from the 
workplace industrial relations tradition with its insight into industrial conflict, but 
ended up with a critique of the limit of the application of the tripartite institutional 
analysis: trade union, management, and the state in China's global factories. 
Alternatively, I suggested that 'unorganised' workers in the industrial conflicts 
should be regarded as a 'collective' player in the analysis of the development of 
workplace industrial relations in China. To bring in the role of workers was not to 
downplay the function of institutions. Instead, in Chapter Six, I brought a 
perspective of legal institutionalism to the study of the labour regime with the cases 
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of the Moon factory and its sister factory, also in Shen Zhen, concentrating on the 
issue of the wage. I suggested that wage politics is a contested terrain for workers, 
management, and the state, and so an essential topic to explore. There I argued that 
workers' struggle had pressed the state to provide a new legal context which, in turn, 
imposed limits on management. However, the incapacity of the workplace trade 
union or alternative organization to play its primary role of representation impeded 
the transition of the labour regime, which I called 'contested despotism', into 
'hegemony' along with the wider context of political economy (Burawoy, 1979). 
The question of workplace representation was studied in Chapter Seven through the 
case of the Star factory, where international civil society attempted to experiment 
with a model for democratic workplace representation in China. In this concluding 
chapter, the puzzles laid out in Chapters One and Two will be linked with the 
findings and discussions from Chapters Three to Seven. 
Emerging Patterns of Workers' Protests 
As shown in Chapters Three to Seven, one of the most significant developments of 
labour relations has been taking place since 2004. This view is shared by the 
research findings of CLB, an independent labour NGO based in Hong Kong (CLB, 
2005b; 2007). CLB published two 'China Labour Movement Observation Reports' 
with a 2005 version covering 2000 to 2004 and a 2007 one for 2005 and 2006. The 
reports were based on a nationwide macro-analysis of official statistics, official and 
academic documents, media-reported cases, and journalists' articles. The 2005 
report highlighted the labour surplus and employment pressure in the country: 
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The sources from the CCP Propaganda Department and the MOLSS showed 
that... from 2001-2005... the city and town population which was seeking 
employment reached as high as 22 to 23 million each year, but the new jobs 
created each year only accounted for 7 to 8 million. Meanwhile, 150 million of 
surplus labour power was waiting to be transferred. 
CLB (2005b: 4) 
But the 2007 report highlighted a labour shortage and the changing form of 
labour protests in 2005 and 2006: 
From 2003, a phenomenon of labour shortage emerged in the eastern coastal 
region... the SOE reform which culminated in privatization had basically 
finished... in the post-reform enterprises, the wages, welfare and working 
conditions had lost any significant difference with the FlEs and POEs... the 
previous SOE employees (urban employees) in the post-reformed enterprises 
also started to strive for their own rights and interests by strikes. And also, the 
basic demands of the urban employees and peasant workers were towards 
convergence as most of them involved directly [demanding] a wage rise and 
working conditions improvement. This is because there is no significant 
difference between the post-reformed previous SOE and FIE and POE in terms 
of their management strategies and employment conditions, with the 
employment conditions in some [former SOEs] being even worse than the 
latter. CLB (2007: 4,9) 
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These reports confirmed my analysis in Chapter One, that the protests of laid- 
off SOE workers and pensioners would lose their significance as a sustainable actor 
for social transformation in China and this agency would potentially be replaced by 
the new working class. 62 
With a concentration on local cases, ethnographic study may fail to grasp a 
general national picture, which orthodox industrial relations and labour movement 
studies may prefer. It was not my intention to provide a national account of patterns 
of workers' strikes. Rather, I saw Shen Zhen as a pioneer in workers' struggle. This 
city is most prone to labour conflicts, as the number of cases handled by its labour 
dispute arbitration committees was reported to be as high as one tenth of the total 
national figure (Nanfang Mao, 28 October 2004). But the CLB 2007 report 
complementarily affirmed that the characteristics of the migrant workers' struggles 
in Shen Zhen to some extent were also shared by protests in the factories of other 
ownerships and in other geographic areas. 63 
As far as the city of Shen Zhen was concerned, I adopted a multi-case method 
(Elger and Smith, 2005) to explore the similarities and differences of labour 
relations over time. My selection of cases before 2004 was based on the availability 
of resources and informants, the cases after 2004, namely the Uniden, Sun, and 
Moon factories, however, were selected from among a dozen strike cases I first 
exposed. My decision to explore these cases in-depth was because of their level of 
62 By a new working class here, I mean not only migrant workers in FIEs which this study focused 
on, but also urban and migrant workers who are working in enterprises of other ownership forms. 
63 For instance, the CLB report quoted a journalist's article on a strike wave of migrant workers in Da 
Lian, a coastal metropolitan city in northeastern China. The strike was led by workers in a Japanese 
factory in July 2005 and strikers successfully achieved a wage rise after the intervention of the trade 
union and the government. The strike then extended to more than ten other Japanese factories in the 
city (Zhan, 2005). 
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militancy and influence among the workers' community. All of these three cases 
happened in large FIEs and were well-known among workers in Shen Zhen, or at 
least in the district of Bao An. Rather than being typical cases, they were among the 
vanguard form of labour protests, which is ideal to explain and predict the scope and 
limits of industrial conflicts and organizations in China. 
In order to make comparison possible and highlight the significance of the 
impact of the labour market and economic expansion on workplace struggles 
(Franzosi, 1995), 1 borrowed the phrase 'wave of strikes' from Taylor et al. (2003: 
175), who described strikes in the FlEs of South China in the early 1990s as 'the 
third wave of strikes' in the history of the People's Republic. By this concept, the 
strikes of the Uniden, Sun, and Moon factories were well within a new wave of 
strikes from 2004 to 2005 due to the further expansion of global production into 
China after the country's WTO entry in 2001. Characteristics of strikes in this wave 
were around the enforcement of the minimum wage and social insurance. In August 
2007, the Moon factory was only an example of a sim ilar wave of strikes that forced 
the city government to raise the minimum wage in October that year, although its 
duration and scale was shorter and smaller compared to the 2004 to 2005 round due 
to the prompt response from the state. The strikes in Uniden, Sun, and Moon were 
organised by different groups of workers, but workers learned from each other and 
accumulated experience as a collective. In fact, a cross-factory informal network 
was well developed among workers, especially those from the same province and in 
the skilled and supervisory range. In the light of this, I attempted to track a historical 
trend from the strike cases presented in this thesis. 
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Although cases of strikes were reported in the region as early as the 1980s, 
their impact and scale were considerably smaller compared with the waves of strikes 
since 1993. A series of commonalities was evidenced across the pattern of strikes 
from 1993 to 2007. First, the occurrence of strike waves had a direct relation with 
the expansion of global capitalism and state intervention in production and 
reproduction of the labour force. Second, there were issues of discontent deeply 
embedded in the labour process which were hard to resolve through existing formal 
channels. Third, there was an immediate cause negatively affecting workers' 
interests as a touch off point of the strike. Fourth, some hidden leaders, who were 
usually supervisory and skilled workers, acting underground to lead the strikers were 
important components of a strike. Fifth, violence or gangster activism was usually 
used to force others to strike or show discontent towards the top factory management. 
Sixth, a strike exerted a knock-on effect in other factories. 
However, detailed analysis also shows evidence of significant developments: 
1. The workers' demands were more and more radical, from within the limit of the 
law to beyond the law. In 1993 and 1994, when management responded to the 
workers' wage rise demands by charging or increasing food, accommodation, or 
other fees, workers failed to resist the acts as they were legal (AMRC, 1995). In 
2004 and 2005, however, workers demanded real implementation of the minimum 
wage without any deductions. In 2007, strikers asked for a reasonable and decent 
wage as well as a proper working and living environment. 
2. They learned from past experience and from each other, so their struggle became 
strategically more sophisticated over time. From 1993 to 1994, the strikers contained 
365 
themselves within the complex of the factory (AMRC, 1995). In 2004 and 2007, 
workers began to walk onto the highway to attract public attention and state 
intervention. In the Sun factory case in 2004, workers transferred struggle 
experiences to the new factory in another city. In the Moon factory in 2007, two 
factories within the same company co-ordinated with each other to stage a joint 
strike. 
3. The 'shortage of labourl had increased the confidence of the workers (Franzosi, 
1995). Despite the fact that the supply of migrant workers seemed to be unlimited in 
the early 1990s (Lee, 1998), the further expansion of global capitalism into China 
promptly pushed up the demand for labour (Lewis, 1954). One of the key 
characteristics of the 2004 and 2007 strikes was the large scale of quitting following 
the strike. Workers could easily get a job soon after the strike. Edwards and 
Scullion's (1982) study suggested that quitting itself is a form of industrial conflict. 
This study showed quitting, as an individual form, increased in parallel with the 
strike as a collective form of struggle. Although workers' wages were mostly raised 
after the strikes, their discontent with the management could not be removed. Skilled 
workers in particular were not in fact in 'unlimited supply' when the economy was 
in the process of rapid growth (Lewis, 1954). 
4. The high turnover rate aggravated the effect of the 'shortage of labour' and 
lowered productivity. The strike further strengthened rank-and-file workers' 
confidence and increased the conflict between workers and management. 'Voice' 
and then 'quit' or 'voice' again became a common way to express their discontent, 
borrowing the terms from Hirschman (1970). This new pattern of workplace conflict 
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brought a big challenge to the management, whose first concern is productivity, and 
the state, which was keen to maintain social order and a favourable investment 
environment. The emerging patterns of workers' protest had forced the state to 
improve labour protections (e. g. new labour legislation and higher minimum wage 
rate) and the management to adopt new business strategies (e. g. production 
relocation to other parts of China and outsourcing). But workers' struggle strategy 
also changed over time due to the changing legal, social, economic, and political 
contexts. 
5. The skilled and supervisory staff played a significant leading role in workers' 
struggle. In Uniden, the role of the engineers in the R&D department was pinpointed. 
In the Sun and Moon factories, the leading and organising role rested on skilled and 
supervisory staff, some of whom were attached to original-place-based community 
gangsters. Their privileged status in the labour market, production, and community 
had provided them with much more workplace, market, and to a lesser extent 
associational powers than ordinary workers (Wright, 2000). This provided them 
many organising resources which the ordinary workers lacked, as we saw in the 
Moon factory case. 
6. The challenge from workers' protest forced the government to improve workers' 
legal protection. In light of the 1993 to 1994 strikes, the speech of the labour 
minister Li Bo Yong, which I quoted in Chapter Three, was clear evidence. For 2004 
to 2005, a Labour Contract Law was legislated in 2007 to strengthen workers' 
individual and collective rights, alongside a Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law 
and an Employment Promotion Law. At the local level, the legal minimum wage 
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rate was dramatically increased after the wave of strikes in 2004 and 2005. The 
capacity of the workers' strike to push forward the legal minimum wage was more 
precisely demonstrated by the Moon factory case in 2007. 
7. While workers and intellectuals in the early 1990s tried to organise independent 
trade unions, which continued to be strictly prohibited by the party state, both the 
strikers and civil society had adopted a more pragmatic way to address the issue of 
FOA. In the Uniden case, a trade union, under the umbrella of the ACFrU, was one 
of the key demands of the workers in the strike. In fact, they sought advice from the 
higher level trade union and received a positive response that they had the right to 
establish a trade union in their factory. And to a lesser extent, workers in the Sun and 
Moon factories also demanded the establishment of a trade union. However, the 
trade union established after strikes in these factories remained highly manipulated 
by the management. Workers in the Moon factory demanded the inclusion of rank- 
and-file representatives in the union comn-dttee, but they were not successful. By 
contrast, the factory responded by promising a regular meeting with front-line 
supervisors. 
Dynamics and Limitations of Workers' Protests 
Lee argued that 'Chinese workers can hardly be described as having much 
marketplace, workplace, or associational bargaining power' (Lee, 2007a: 24). 
Alternatively, I have argued that Chinese migrant workers have significantly 
enhanced their 'marketplace bargaining power' and 'workplace bargaining power' 
with the further development of capitalism. Their wage standard, for example, was 
significantly increased. This can be accounted for by two reasons: first, the shortage 
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of labour or workers' 'marketplace bargaining power'; second, the wave of strikes or 
workers' 'workplace bargaining power'. The high turnover rate and the consistence 
of resistance in the workplace are new forms of workers' struggle which reshape the 
class power balance. By highlighting the rising capacity of workers, this research 
contests the simple pessimistic thesis of 'working class crisis' under globalisation. 
However, workers' associational power, and so a labour movement, is still 
fundamentally weak. The workplace trade unions did not play their primary role. 
Without a representative body in the workplace to channel the interests of workers, 
workers understandably staged other forms of protests, from quitting and complaints 
to stoppages, strikes, and demonstrations, to express their grievances. This has made 
workplace relationships highly unstable. From the wide ranging discussions in this 
thesis, especially in Chapter Seven, a series of factors can be identified as 
obstructions to effective workplace organisations. 
First, as the economy was still in rapid expansion, 'voice' and then 'exit' was 
more common than 'voice' and 'stay' as workers found it easy to get another job 
with similar or sometimes better pay. Here the labour market exerted a dual effect on 
workers' activism. It encouraged protest, but not necessarily organisation. Capital's 
capacity to relocate and outsource production also weakened workers' market, 
workplace, and associational power. In all of the main cases in this thesis, from 
Uniden, to the Sun, Moon, and Star factories, the management had relocated part of 
their production out of Shen Zhen. 
Second, the Hukou system, which had an effect of separating the production 
and reproduction of labour, also made stable workers' community and workplace 
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organisation hard to achieve. Chinese New Year festivals were still a high tide for 
workers to quit from their jobs, go back home, and then look for a new job after 
holidays with no pay, although in Chapter Four, I illustrated that workers had tended 
to stay a long period in both the Sun factory and Militant village. These 
characteristics had made the factory and the village a pioneer in terms of the 
militancy and duration of workers' struggle. In Chapter Three, I also indicated that a 
certain number of older migrant workers returned to their villages under the state 
initiative to cancel the agriculture tax, implying the availability of collective land in 
the villages, an effect of the socialist Hukou system, which still provides a means of 
living for at least some of the migrant workers. More significantly, the reproduction 
of the new generation of labour was finished in the rural villages, rather than the 
urban areas. Xiao Ying and Xiao Lin, for example, had to leave their child at home 
with their parents. Within the factory, the personal network rooted in the traditional 
society is prevalent and exploited by the factory as a control strategy, in some cases 
with an interaction between gender, locality, and the attached gangsterism. 
Third, there were no powerful external institutions ready to provide support to 
workplace organisations and their activists. Although the awareness of the ordinary 
workers about the trade union was feeble, a certain element of the skilled and 
supervisory staff has much more consciousness on the question of association. In 
fact, strikers, or more precisely, the leaders of the strikes, tried to form or reform a 
workplace trade union throughout the strike cases from 1994 to 2007 presented in 
this thesis. International civil society also put much effort into facilitating effective 
workplace organisations, either a trade union or an alternative committee from 2000, 
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while the ACFrU itself also pushed some of its workplace affiliates to experiment 
with direct elections (A. Chan, 2006a; Howell, 2006). However, there was no single 
successful workplace organisation which was able to take workers' interests 
seriously in a sustainable way. The fundamental issue was the manipulation of the 
management over the workplace organisations (Clarke et al., 2004; CL33,2008). In 
this study, from Uniden and the Moon to the Star factories, active and independent 
union and welfare committee members were all under pressure from management. A 
legal framework for negotiation was available, but the right to strike was not 
recognised after it was omitted from the revised 1982 version of the constitution. 
Even in the new wave of the unionisation campaign since 2006, as I discussed in 
Chapter Seven, the SZMFrU and local state's interests were more in the 
establishment of workplace trade unions to fulfil political and administrative targets, 
rather than activating workplace representation. The Trade Union Law reform in 
2001 had enhanced the trade union's representative and mediating role, while at the 
same time tightening up the control of higher level trade unions over their affiliates 
to pre-empt independent trade unionism (F. Chen, 2003b). However, the reality is 
that while the workplace trade union was manipulated by management, the higher 
level of the trade unions as a part of the party state did not have much leverage over 
workplace organisation without support from the state and the co-operation of 
management. Its function as a class organisation to represent and be monitored by 
the workers is empty. The role of the local state was even more ambiguous, 
considering its patron-client relations with business. Labour NGOs n-dght play a 
role, but their weak political and legal foundation undermined their leeway in China. 
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Their existence was under state monitoring. The party state was especially sensitive 
to intervention from international civil society in the country's labour politics. Grass 
roots labour NGOs, however, mostly depended on overseas funding to survive. 
In short, the economic conditions and the legacy of state socialism (by Hukou 
and socialist trade unionism) have resulted in the separation of production from 
reproduction of labour and the ACFIU from its rank-and-file members. Going back 
to the grand theory competition on the uniqueness of labour politics in China that I 
reviewed in Chapter Two, here I prefer a political economy and institutional account, 
while paying full attention to the cultural factors, as I will discuss in the following 
section. 
Class Relations, Class Identity, and Class Struggle 
Scholars who have studied migrant workers' protest in modem China from a 
culturalist perspective have tended to downplay the existence of class-consciousness 
by emphasizing non-class identities like place, gender, and skill (Honig, 1986; 
Hershatter, 1986; Perry, 1993). Their approach has continued to influence 
ethnographic studies in contemporary China (Yu, 2006; Lee, 2007a). 
In her recent book, Lee (2007a) privileged 'citizenship' over 'class' identity 
for migrant workers and implied that laid-off state workers were more class- 
conscious, although the former was within and the latter was outside a capitalist 
class relation. In Chapter Two, I commented that she abstracted 'class' from its 
historical context and material base. The abstraction made her put 'class' as one of 
the discourses among workers in protests: 'the discourse of class, Maoism, 
citizenship, and legality as the repertoire of standards of justice and insurgent 
372 
identity claims' (Lee, 2007a: 29). But as this study showed, the language of class is 
not a reliable basis on which to make a judgement of class-consciousness and class 
behaviour. For example, in the Sun factory, workers in day-to-day life distinguished 
each other by their provincial identities: Si Chuan Ren (Sichuan people); 
Waishengren (people from other province/s), and called their boss Taiwan Lao 
(Taiwanese guy), implying themselves as mainland Chinese; in the Moon factory 
workers called themselves Tongbao (fellow countrymen) as opposed to a German 
manager. But after supervisory and skilled workers returned to work on the second 
day of the strike, production position identities, Zhiyuan and Yuangong, were 
employed to denounce the 'betrayal' by Zhiyuan and consolidate solidarity among 
Yuangong. No single mention of Gongren (worker) or Gongren Jieji (working class) 
was used. But workers who worked for factories in the community sourced by other 
capital, including those owned by local mainland Chinese bosses, also followed their 
example of striking with similar demands. Obviously workers would not perceive 
that the strike was against the Taiwanese or Germans, but the boss. While class as a 
discourse or language cannot explain this spreading of the strike in the community, 
class as social relations can. The purpose of studying the usage in discourses of 
terms such as Si Chuan people, mainland people, Tongbao, Yuangong (employee), 
Zhiyuan (staff) and Zhiyuangong (staff and employees) in the protest is to explore 
how a basis of solidarity is constructed or deconstructed in a specific context. 
However, as an analytical tool, the 'subjective' basis of solidarity in term of 
workers' self-identification is by no means able to transcend or replace 'objective' 
class interests rooted in class relations. As Clarke (1978) illuminated, class relations 
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and their political and ideological forms cannot be separated from each other in class 
analysis, but the concept of class as a social relation should be analytically prior to 
the latter. 
The significance of the 'subjective' base of solidarity was evidenced by the 
development of strikes in 2007 from those in 2004 and 2005. In strikes from 2004 to 
2005, in which workers' demands were basically for enforcement of their legal 
rights, the language of legality provided a bottom line and a base of solidarity for the 
supervisory, skilled, semi-skilled, and ordinary workers: 'The Sun factory violates 
the Labour Law and does not raise wages! ' the banner proclaimed. However, in the 
2007 strike, workers' demands had gone beyond the law and asked for a 
'reasonable', rather than a legal wage. This base of solidarity was lost. Workers then 
were divided by the management with its strategy to give supervisory and skilled 
staff more concessions. Some supervisors then turned to persuade ordinary workers 
back to work, while ordinary workers had a strong sense of being 'betrayed'. From 
then on, a base of solidarity was based on production position: Yuangong, emerged 
to consolidate solidarity in the strike. It does not suggest that workers in the Sun 
factory had more a citizenship identity, while their counterparts in the Moon factory 
had an ordinary worker (Yuangong) identity. In fact, they were under the same class 
relations as their boss from either Germany or Taiwan but developed a different base 
of solidarity in different contexts. 
One may contest that the 'betrayal' of Zhiyuan provided a hint at the 
ambiguous role of the middle range staff, which did not necessarily support the 
&class interest', and so the strike was not a class action. The question of class action 
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will be discussed below, but for this case, I understood this phenomenon in a 
specific local context. 
Firstly, leaders in the strike were all victims of revenge and victimization by 
the management during or after the strike. There were not any legal and institutional 
supports for this range of activists. In the Uniden case, there were some engineers 
who stood firmly for the interests of ordinary workers or class interests. But their 
leaders were victimized and finally dismissed. In this sense, after some of the 
supervisory and skilled workers went back to work, it was understandable that the 
hidden leaders of the strike, who were machinery repairers, did not stand up to push 
forward the strike. 
Second, the management's divisive strategy was not successful. The strike in 
fact continued. The more significant moment for the collapse of the strike was when 
the factory announced that workers could resign from their work immediately and 
those who came back to work would get extra payment. It was a concession from the 
management and so a material gain for workers as many of them were in the queue 
for an 'approval' to resign or planning to resign. In fact, allowing so many workers 
to leave immediately was also a big cost for the factory. 
Even during a strike organised by a trade union in the West, some workers go 
back to work earlier than the others. But as a strike is not legally recognised in China, 
a picket line is impossible. The weakness of wildcat strikes in China is more an 
organisational and institutional drawback, of course also with an experience 
constraint, rather than a consciousness issue. 
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Considering the possible positive insights from the cultural and identity studies 
on the exploration of how solidarity was created or collapsed (Fantasia, 1998), in 
this study, full attention was paid to these aspects of 'identities': home place, 
gangster, gender, skill, and age. Although the traditional boundaries of these 'intra- 
class divisions' are usually exploited by management to divide and pacify workers, 
they can function in the interests of workers when their structural power was 
increased, as we saw in the case of the Sun factory. These traditional values also 
helped to articulate justice behind workers' collective action (McAdam, 1988). The 
sense of 'injustice' and confidence that had developed from industrial masculinity 
was one of the prominent factors accounting for workers' enthusiasm in the protests. 
Moreover, as time goes on, with common experience of social life, workers' 
traditional attachment is a potential to be transformed into a more open cross- 
provincial class-based network in the community (Sargeson, 2001). 
After connecting the class relations in China's global factory with workers' 
identity and intra-class division, a dilemma remained on the relationship between 
class organizations and class struggle. In the West, the Marxist tradition of labour 
studies generally linked class organisations with class struggle or class action, while 
the industrial relations studies also took for granted a tripartite institutional analysis: 
union, management, and the state. Katznelson (1986) defined 'class action' as 
actions 'that are organized and through movements and organisations to affect 
society and the position of class within it'. Similarly, Burawoy (1979: 179) referred 
to 'class struggle' as the struggle between union and management. Under these 
definitions, there is no class action or class struggle in China. However, experiences 
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in NICs, such as South Korea (Koo, 2001), showed that a workers' independent 
trade union was a result rather than a precondition of workers' collective 
mobilization. In China, the workers' struggle has brought considerable challenges to 
both management and the state. As shown in this study, their collective actions were 
able to improve wage, welfare, and working conditions by directly gaining 
concessions from the management, and indirectly pressing the central state, local 
authority, and the ACFlU to improve their regulations and policies. Therefore, I 
suggested that 'unorganised workers' in industrial conflicts as a collective should be 
regarded as an independent party in the analysis of the transformation of industrial 
relations in China, crediting its capacity to press concessions from state legislation, 
legal enforcement, and management. As far as class action or class struggle is 
concerned, we should distinguish between different levels of class or struggles for 
clarification. 
As reviewed in Chapter Two, Katznelson (1986) offered a four-layered 
framework: class structure, class organisation, class disposition, and class action. 
Katznelson (1986: 20) defined 'class action' as 'classes that are organized and that 
act through movements and organizations to affect society and the position of class 
within it'. Under his framework, as class organization is ineffective in contemporary 
China, workers' collective actions that by-pass the ACFrU are not class actions. 
However, within a capitalist class structure, workers in China have shown some 
extent of class disposition or class-consciousness. For example, strikers in the Sun 
factory raised the slogan in their demonstration: 'for our common interests'. This is 
not to suggest that the class-consciousness of migrant workers had been mature. 
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Instead, I put it into a historical context to see how it changed over time, inspired by 
Tbompson's (1963) historical approach. If we compare the worst case of a strike in 
the 1980s in which only twenty-one workers stopped work without any voice with 
the well-planned 2007 strike in a similar geographic area, a historical advance was 
very apparent. As a development and critique of 71bompson's (1963) England- 
centred approach, Katznelson indicated that a better framework of class formation 
was a historically and internationally comparative one. However, his notion of class 
action was still western-centred and less useful to study class formation in countries 
like China. The reason is that the condition of class organization is too complicated 
in the non-westem world to bind class action with class organization. 64 
Burawoy (1979: 179) also provided a categorization for workplace class 
struggle: economic, political, and ideological. For him, 'economic class struggle' is 
to reshape 'the distribution of economic rewards'. Under this definition, workers' 
workplace struggle in China today should be well within the sphere of 'economic 
class struggle' by considering its capacity to obtain class-based material interests 
and reshape economic distribution in society by their collective actions. However, 
ideological struggle, or struggle over relations of production, is basically non- 
existent, while political struggle or the struggle over relations in production is 
defensive and passive rather than proactive and persistent in China. 
64 In many developing countries, there are multiple trade union syndicates with different political 
orientations. In South Korea, for example, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions now competes 
with the newly rising Korean Confederation of Trade Unions. Both camps declare themselves as 
representing working class interests although their strategies towards the state and capital are often 
oppositional to each other. Then action from which camp can be hailed as 'class action'? If we 
identity that both of the trade union organized actions are class actions, then there might be two kinds 
of class action oppositional to each other. This phenomenon also exists in other eastern Asian NICs 
like Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
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As the class organization-centred approach showed its limitations and 
contradictions in grasping the development of class relations in China, I referred to 
workplace struggle in China as 'class struggle without class organization'. To 
underpin the positive dynamics of the economic class struggle is not to suggest a 
labour movement or 'class-for-itself' had emerged in China. On the contrary, the 
limitation of the class struggle in China is exactly due to its concentration on the 
economic aspect and the existence of traditional and structural obstacles that 
prevented it from giving rise to political and ideological struggles. I have identified 
the barriers to the rise of the political struggle in the workplace in my discussion of 
weak workers' associational power. Here I would add one point for the difficulty of 
ideological struggle. Ideological struggle needs an imagination of social relations 
beyond capitalism. This imagination was especially feeble among migrant workers 
due to the history of Chinese 'socialism'. Nfigrant workers' memory of Maoism and 
$socialism' were not the same as the urban workers under the urban-rural separation 
policy of Hukou. The resources of the rural regions were mobilized to support urban 
construction in Mao's era. The poverty and backwardness of the rural villages is still 
a memory for many migrant workers. It was a dream for many migrant workers to 
stay in a city, such as the first generation of migrant workers like Lian, whose story 
was presented in Chapter Tluee, and the new generation of working couples, Xiao 
Lin and Xiao Ying, whose struggles I illustrated in Chapter Four. When Dagong was 
not a good choice, the only way out was to run a small business, rather than 
imagining other more progressive ideas. An ideological struggle has a much longer 
way to go for Chinese workers behind the changing economic, social, legal, and 
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political contexts that may create opportunities for the exercise of a political struggle 
in the workplace, as I will discuss in the final section. 
Labour Challenge and the Changing Labour Regime 
A main theme of this thesis is that workers' workplace struggle has exerted 
significant challenges to central and local state authorities as well as global capital in 
the context of an expanding economy. Capital responded to these challenges by 
work intensification, production rationalization and expansion, relocation, and 
outsourcing. The local state reacted by better enforcement of the labour regulations 
and steady enhancement of the minimum wage rate, while the central state initiated a 
new round of labour legislation to better protect workers' rights and interests. The 
ACFlU was under strong pressure from the Party-state to reform itself by extending 
its coverage in the workplace, although there have been very few successful cases of 
effective workplace trade unionism so far. The new labour NGOs also arose since 
the 1990s to provide workers with legal education and assistance, although they did 
not have a sound legal ground to survive in the country. 
In this scenario, the main barrier to a 'class-for-itself' in China was the state 
manipulation of the ACFrU and the management's manipulation of its workplace 
organizations, while the effective strategy to relocate and expand production and 
separation of production and reproduction by the Hukou system also played some 
role. 
However, there were also some positive developments for a more stable 
workers' community and organization. Both the factors of Hukou and production 
relocations had dual effects on the forms of workers' activism. On the one hand, 
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availability of job opportunities in other cities or factories, and other survival means 
in workers' home villages would encourage workers' struggle by 'voice' and 'exit' 
or just 'exit'. On the other hand, they would make a stable labour force, urban 
community, and ultimately workers' organization more difficult to achieve. 
However, although the turnover rate was very high, many workers in fact returned to 
the factories some months later, while management had to abandon or loosen their 
policy of restricting those leaving the factory without proper approval from coming 
back to the factory because of the difficulty of hiring workers. Workers found that 
the pay and working conditions were more or less similar in different factories. One 
of the explanations for the rise of the labour shortage in the PRD was that workers 
had flowed to the YRD. However, as we saw in Chapter Six, the minimum wage rate 
had been formulated with reference to other cites with a similar economic 
development level. Militant village also demonstrated the possibility of a more 
stable worker community and network. Like Xiao Ying and Xiao Lin, many workers 
left the community, but came back after a period of time. Their return to the village 
was just because a familiar social network and lifestyle was available there. Like 
many others, Xiao Ying's dream to run a business was broken while her working life 
in the factory next to the Sun factory continued after a short disruption. For millions 
of young migrants, Dagong is the only possibility of making a living. More 
significantly, skilled workers were more stable staying in a factory with more market 
and workplace bargaining power, while their associational power was dislocated in 
the form of informal networks or sometimes gangsterism. 
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This thesis is being finished on the eve of the thirtieth anniversary of the 
initiation by Deng Xiao Ping of 'reform and open door' policy in 1978. No 
momentous celebration was planned by the Party-state. Alternatively, along with the 
Beijing Olympics, the Si Chuan earthquake, and the unrest in Tibet, the Chinese 
state is facing the challenge of rising domestic inflation and a declining global 
economy. On 2 June 2008, the Shen Zhen government held a joint press conference 
with its subordinate SZMLSSB to announce the new minimum wage for the year 
from I July 2008: 1,000 yuan for inside the SEZ and 900 yuan for outside. Apart 
from the rising wages in competitive cities, attention was also paid to the escalating 
inflation rate of the Consumer Price Index (Nanfang Ribao, 3 June 2008). The new 
rate in Shen Zhen keeps its main competitor, Shang Hai, whose minimum wage is 
960 yuan, in second place nationally. Along with a mounting wage standard, three 
labour ordinances, namely the Labour Contract Law, the Employment Promotion 
Law, and the Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, which were legislated 
in 2007, provide a new legal framework for workers' rights and interests. 
Nevertheless, without considerably more associational power, I would not put 
workers' struggle under a framework of a labour movement, considering its 
weakness to exercise a political and ideological challenge to the state and capital. 
Instead, I apply the notion of 'a changing labour regime', which was also used by 
Lee (1999) referring to the SOE reform, to sketch the changing power relations in 
the global factories and beyond. As despotism is still prevailing and the state's 
intervention and workers' collective actions are more and more potent, I refer to it as 
'contested despotism', which has the potential to give way to a new form of factory 
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regime. The underlying drives of the factory regime transition are from two fronts, 
capitalist competition and class struggle (Burawoy, 1979). Here I reconstruct 
Burawoy's concept to bring in Chinese workers' collective actions that by-pass the 
official trade union as the economic class struggle. To what extent can workers' 
activism continue to reshape the labour regime under changing economic, legal, and 
political contexts? It depends on the dynamic relationship between state regulation, 
management strategy, and workers' collective struggle, while the possibility of 
effective workplace trade unionism remains a central issue. 
Stories of the Chinese migrant workers' struggles reveal that work, factory, 
and working class are far from 'ended' (Gorz, 1980; Rifkin, 1995). Instead, they are 
reconstructed in different spaces in different forms. In fact, the public concern in the 
West with Chinese labour conditions has recently changed from the 'race to the 
bottom' effect on both wages and consumer prices (e. g. 77ze Economist, 30 
September 2004), to the implication of rising wages in China for the stagnation of 
the western economy (Financial Times, 12 June 2008). Although the locations of 
production and forms of employment have dramatically changed since the 1970s, the 
basic logic of the accumulation of global capitalism remains unchanged (Harvey, 
1990; Cohen, 1991; Wood et al., 1998). A new agenda for social scientists is to 
understand how class struggle is unfolded in different local contexts, and how the 
pattern of the struggle changes over time. 
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